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OPER ATION RHINE EXERCISE, MAY 18 –27, 1941
Milan Vego

T

he pursuit and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in May 1941
constituted one of the largest fleet-versus-fleet operations in European waters during World War II. Between May 24 and 27, 1941, the British used five
battleships, two battle cruisers, two aircraft carriers, four heavy and seven light
cruisers, twenty-one destroyers, eight submarines, and fifty aircraft to hunt the
Bismarck combat group.1
The Bismarck combat group’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to attack British convoys in the northern Atlantic—Unternehmen RHEINÜBUNG (Operation
RHINE EXERCISE)—was, for the Germans, an operation; in U.S. terms, a major
operation. Although the main German forces
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STRATEGIC SETTING
For most of the interwar years, the Germans considered France and Poland, and possibly Soviet
Russia, to be their most likely opponents in a future war; they did not consider war with Britain a
serious possibility. In April 1933, the new chancellor, Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, stated that Britain’s
Royal Navy never again would be considered a
potential adversary of the German navy. In line
with this, Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960),
1
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commander in chief (CINC) of the Kriegsmarine (German navy) from 1928 to
1943, built a fleet that was not intended to challenge Britain again unilaterally, but
instead to complement Germany’s policies on the continent.2
By 1937, however, German naval strategy had shifted toward the offensive.
Raeder envisaged energetic employment of German naval forces to exert strategic pressure on the enemy’s superior forces; a more favorable balance of forces
was to result. This became the basis for the Kriegsmarine’s operational thinking.3
On February 3, 1937, in his meeting with Hitler and Field Marshal Werner von
Blomberg (1878–1946), the then minister of war and CINC of the armed forces,
Raeder explained the Kriegsmarine’s strategy in the case of a war. He stated that
what he called Atlantikkriegführung (Atlantic warfare) and war in distant ocean
areas would be part of the larger war effort. The objective would be to secure control of sea communications by hitting the enemy decisively, thereby contributing
to the overall strategic objective.4
A major change in German foreign and military policy came on May 24, 1938,
when Hitler reversed his earlier, more benign views on Great Britain.5 He issued
instructions to consider the country a possible enemy, in addition to France and
Soviet Russia.6 In June 1938, Raeder directed his staff to explore the implications
of a war with Britain.7 This staff study on German naval warfare then served as
the basis for combat instructions issued later in 1938.8 In the summer of 1938,
the Seekriegsleitung (Naval Warfare Directorate) (SKL) produced a memorandum that concluded that, in a future war with Britain, owing to Germany’s
unfavorable geographic position and the likelihood of British naval superiority,
Germany should focus only on commerce warfare on the high seas. Such a war
would be conducted with Panzerschiffe (armored ships popularly referred to
as “pocket” battleships), cruisers, and U-boats. The Germans harbored some
doubts that a successful outcome was even possible.9 High naval officials also
studied the employment of battleships, with contradictory results: all participants
agreed that battleships were necessary, but reached no consensus regarding their
employment.10
Admiral Raeder believed that if a major war broke out, Germany should
concentrate all its forces against Britain. The construction of U-boats and the
production of aircraft must receive unconditional priority. In his concept, the
Luftwaffe would mine the approaches to British ports and destroy transportation facilities, so the Kriegsmarine could conduct trade warfare using U-boats
and surface ships, supported by naval aircraft. Raeder also believed that trade
warfare could not be limited to belligerents but must include attacks on neutral
shipping.11
The Germans were aware that, as things stood, in the case of a war at sea with
Britain their position would be inferior. But Hitler wanted Germany to have
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/6
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a much larger navy, one that could be used as a global instrument of power.
So early in 1938, Hitler directed that a formidable force of battleships be built.
Raeder therefore revised the existing naval construction program. The result was
the so-called Plan Z, which envisaged a Kriegsmarine that was numerically and
qualitatively much larger. Hitler formally approved Plan Z in January 1939. The
projection was that by 1946 the Kriegsmarine would have in service six new-class
fifty-thousand-ton battleships (with diesel engines and 406 mm guns), three newclass ten-thousand-ton pocket battleships, four twenty-thousand-ton aircraft
carriers, five ten-thousand-ton heavy cruisers, sixteen eight-thousand-ton light
cruisers, twenty-two five-thousand-ton scouting cruisers, sixty-eight destroyers,
and ninety torpedo boats. Initially, Plan Z envisaged construction of around 250
U-boats (twenty-seven of two thousand tons, sixty-two 750-ton Type IXs, one
hundred five-hundred-ton Type VIIs, and sixty 250-ton Type IIs).12 In the summer of 1939, the number of U-boats planned was increased to three hundred.13
On August 4, 1939, the SKL directed that in the case of a war the Kriegsmarine
was to cut off enemy sea communications by using all available forces. Enemy
naval forces were to be attacked only if that would contribute to the war on enemy
commerce.14 The day before Germany’s September 1 invasion of Poland, Hitler’s
Directive Number 1 ordered that if Britain and France declared war the Kriegsmarine was to concentrate on commerce destruction, especially against Britain.15
The Luftwaffe was directed to prepare to conduct air attacks against shipping
carrying imports to Britain.16
Yet when war began with Britain and France on September 3, 1939, the construction for which Plan Z called barely had started, and the Kriegsmarine was
unprepared to carry out a protracted war at sea, especially on the open ocean.
Britain’s naval power was overwhelming compared with that of Germany. At that
time the Kriegsmarine had in service six heavy surface combatants: two battleships (which sometimes were referred to as battle cruisers), three pocket battleships, and one heavy cruiser. These were the only units capable of conducting
sustained operations on the open ocean. The remainder of the fleet consisted of
six light cruisers, twenty-two destroyers, and twenty torpedo boats. Under construction were four battleships, two aircraft carriers, four heavy cruisers, sixteen
destroyers, and ten (destroyer-size) torpedo boats. Out of fifty-seven U-boats,
only twenty-two were suitable for employment in the Atlantic.17 Raeder later
wrote that the Kriegsmarine was, from the beginning of war, numerically inferior
to the naval services of its enemies. The Kriegsmarine lacked aircraft carriers and
sufficient escorts for its large surface combatants. It did not have an adequate
number of long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Germany also lacked advanced
naval bases overseas. In Raeder’s view, only unity in planning operations and
decisiveness in their execution could neutralize the enemy’s advantages.18
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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OPERATIONAL SITUATION
Initially, Germany conducted its war on Britain’s maritime commerce almost entirely with U-boats. June 1940 brought great improvement to the U-boat situation
owing to new bases obtained in Norway and France. Use of the French bases reduced the U-boats’ transit distance to their operating areas by some 450 nautical
miles. At the same time, British antisubmarine (A/S) defenses were weak. But the
Germans could not exploit these advantages, because the number of U-boats at
sea was small. Between June 1, 1940, and March 1, 1941, seventy-two U-boats entered into service, while only thirteen were lost. Yet between November 1940 and
February 1941 only some twenty-four boats were operational, and only about ten
were in the operating area at any time.19 At the end of February 1941 the number
of frontline U-boats was only twenty-two; many of the remaining U-boats were
undergoing training.20 However, despite their numerical weakness, the U-boats
were highly successful in destroying enemy shipping. From June 1940 to March
1941, U-boats sank 381 ships of over two million Bruttoregistertonnen (gross
registered tons) (BRT).21
In March 1940, the Germans started to employ auxiliary cruisers in distant
ocean areas.22 By the end of March 1941, the seven auxiliary cruisers then in
service had sunk or captured some eighty ships, of 494,291 BRT. Yet in contrast
to the U-boats, the tonnage of enemy ships the auxiliary cruisers destroyed was
of secondary importance; their principal purpose was to tie down enemy forces
in distant areas, thereby relieving enemy pressure in home waters.23
Admiral Raeder’s views on employing heavy surface ships were influenced
greatly by his personal experiences during World War I. The leaders of the former
Imperial German Navy had been criticized heavily for their failure to employ the
battle line actively during the war, and Raeder was determined that under no
circumstance would an analogous situation develop in the employment of heavy
surface ships during any new war. The German principal objective in employing
heavy surface ships against enemy maritime traffic was to destroy enemy merchant ships. This required that German heavy surface ships remain undamaged
for as long as possible. Hence, they had to avoid encounters with equally strong
or superior enemy forces.24
The Kriegsmarine was unable to begin using its heavy surface ships against
British shipping during the spring and summer of 1940 because it was focusing
all its attention on supporting the campaign in Norway and preparing to carry
out Plan SEELÖWE (SEA LION), the invasion of England. In September 1940,
the Germans attempted for the first time to employ one of their heavy surface
ships, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper, to attack British traffic in the Atlantic.
However, that attempt failed when the ship developed engine problems.25 Engine
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malfunctions also delayed the next attempt, a sortie by the pocket battleship
Admiral Scheer. Finally, on October 29, 1940, Admiral Scheer left Gotenhafen
(Gdynia today) in the Baltic Sea for the Atlantic. It operated in the Caribbean
Sea and the Indian Ocean.26 When it returned to Kiel on April 1 after around 160
days, it had cruised 46,000 nautical miles and sunk seventeen ships of 113,233
BRT.27 Admiral Scheer also forced the enemy to assign large forces to protect his
convoys. In the meantime, Admiral Hipper made a foray into the Atlantic from
November 30 to December 27, 1940. It returned to Brest, France, because of repeated engine problems.28 In its second foray, Admiral Hipper left Brest on February 1 and returned to Kiel on March 28. During this cruise it sank seven ships of
32,896 BRT and heavily damaged two other ships of 9,899 BRT.29
While Admiral Scheer and Admiral Hipper were at sea on January 22, 1941, the
SKL sent battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau out into the Atlantic to attack
enemy shipping (Operation BERLIN). Their two-month cruise was highly successful. Some twenty-two ships of 115,622 BRT were either sunk or captured.30
This number included sixteen enemy ships, of eighty thousand BRT, that had
been sailing independently. Both battleships returned to Brest on March 22.31
From July 1940 to March 1941, German heavy surface ships sank or captured
forty-seven ships of over 250,000 BRT.32 During that same period, Luftwaffe
bombers sank almost the same tonnage.33 Yet this put the performance of both
categories far behind that of the auxiliary cruisers. However, by the spring of
1941 Germany had battleships, heavy cruisers, and auxiliary cruisers operating
in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans.34 Admiral Raeder believed that good
opportunities existed in 1941 to destroy enemy shipping in the Atlantic by using
surface ships in coordination with U-boats.35 And indeed, British shipping losses
from enemy action rose steadily as 1941 unfolded: during February some 403,600
tons of shipping were lost, 529,000 during March, and 687,000 during April. Most
of these losses occurred in the Atlantic.36
To Admiral Raeder and the SKL, the results from employing heavy surface
ships during the fall of 1940 and the winter and spring of 1941 confirmed that
their concept was valid. They had high hopes for even greater future successes
after the entry into service within a few months of Bismarck and Tirpitz, the
strongest battleships in the world. At the same time, Raeder and the SKL had
no illusions; a day would come when operations with heavy surface ships in the
Atlantic would become prohibitively risky. For instance, they considered it only
a matter of time before the United States entered the war.37 Hence, their intent
was to intensify the employment of their heavy surface forces while it was still
possible to do so.38
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Operating Area
The area in which the opposing forces operated encompassed rather a large part
of the eastern North Atlantic. Prior to combat, the Bismarck group moved from
Gotenhafen across the southeastern part of the Baltic, through the Danish straits,
and along the Norwegian coast up to Trondheim. Almost all the combat actions
took place in the area between latitudes 45 and 67 degrees N and between longitudes 10 and 40 degrees W. This area is bounded by Iceland and Greenland to
the north, Ireland and Scotland to the east, and the Faeroe and Shetland Islands
to the northeast.
The climate in the northeastern Atlantic, the British Isles, and Iceland is influenced greatly by the remnants of the Gulf Stream, the Icelandic Low in winter
months, and the North Atlantic Subtropical High. These factors result in mild,
rainy winters and relatively dry summers.39 The North Atlantic is well known for
its bad weather; fair weather is rare.40 In general, clouds cover the area up to 70
percent of the year, mostly with low-altitude formations.41
In the eastern Atlantic, winds generally blow from the west. While they decrease in the summer, winds higher than force 4 prevail at least 65 percent of the
year.42
In the northeastern Atlantic, storms are fairly frequent, especially north of
the British Isles. The most dangerous are large storms that stall over the central
North Atlantic. They sweep the area with strong southwesterly winds, creating heavy seas for long periods. These extratropical cyclones (large-scale lowpressure weather systems that occur in midlatitudes) are most prevalent during
the winter months. Off the west coasts of England, Scotland, and Ireland, winds
are strongest from October through March, with December and January the
roughest months.43
In the northern part of the North Atlantic, field ice appears in January and
lasts until April.44 Harbor ice may occur from December to May; during the period in question, it generally prevented the use of ports in Greenland, Labrador,
Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia.45 Pack ice and icebergs are carried down the
east coast of Greenland through the Denmark Strait. Between mid-August and
November or December there is little ice in the Denmark Strait; navigation is
more restricted during the rest of the year, especially from March to June, when
ice covers most of the strait. However, ice seldom is found within the hundredfathom line, owing to a warm, northward-flowing current.46
The North Atlantic itself is too deep for laying mines; however, mines could
be laid in the Denmark Strait, off the coasts of Iceland and Britain, and in the
Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages.47 Iceland’s entire coast is fronted by an
extensive 110-fathom shelf that extends forty to sixty miles offshore. In January
1941, the British laid some two thousand mines between Iceland and the Faeroe
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/6
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Islands, more mines in February, and 6,100 more in March. On April 26, mines
were laid off the northwest tip of Iceland, with the minefield extending some fifty
miles in a northwesterly direction.48 Reportedly, the Germans were aware of this
minefield.49
The duration of the day in the operating area greatly affected the employment
of guns, torpedoes, and aircraft. Among other things, long, bright nights in the
summer made it difficult to conceal the movement of ships. For example, on
May 24, 1941, sunrise at latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 27 degrees W was
at 0710, sunset at 0419. Thus, the duration of daylight was twenty-one hours,
nine minutes. On the same day, sunrise at latitude 48 degrees N and longitude 42
degrees W occurred at 0258, sunset at 1830; the duration of the day was fifteen
hours, thirty-two minutes. Conversely, long nights encompass a large part of the
area from late fall to early spring. This heavily constrained the effectiveness of
air reconnaissance. Long nights also limited the duration of aircraft contacts and
the employment of torpedo aircraft and bombers from carriers and land bases.
This greatly increased the likelihood of U-boats attacking successfully. At higher
latitudes, long daylight during the summer months made it easy to observe and
destroy supply ships. For the Germans, the most favorable time for breaking out
into the northern Atlantic was from November through February; the most unfavorable, from May through September.50
The area of operations for the German naval forces and the Luftwaffe stretched
from the Polish and German coasts in the Baltic Sea to Denmark and Norway’s
occupied southwestern and western coasts. The most important bases were at
Gotenhafen and Danzig (Gdańsk today) and the Bergen area and Trondheim
in Norway. The British Royal Navy used a relatively large number of naval/air
bases in northern Scotland and the Orkneys. On Scotland’s eastern coast, the
most important naval bases were at Cromarty, Invergordon, and Inverness. The
Firth of Clyde (near Glasgow), Loch Ewe, Liverpool (in northwest England), and
Pembroke (in southwest Wales) were the largest bases on Britain’s western coast.51
Scapa Flow was the main base for the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet. It is the best
anchorage in the Orkneys, offering ships an almost landlocked shelter. Depths
range up to 118 feet, while tidal currents within the harbor are almost negligible.52 The distance from Scapa Flow to Trondheim is 795 miles.
The British ships and aircraft based in northern Scotland operated from a central position in relation to any hostile force trying to break out through the Denmark Strait and the Iceland–Faeroes–Shetlands passages. Hence, they benefited
from divergent and relatively short lines of operation. The distance between the
Pentland Firth (a strait separating the Orkneys from Caithness, in northern Scotland) and Reykjavík is about 790 miles. Similarly, the British forces that patrolled
the Denmark Strait or were based in Iceland were located in a central position
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019
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and hence also had short and diverging lines of operation. In contrast, the German surface ships approaching the British blocking positions had to traverse long
and converging lines of operation.
Operational Command and Control
One of the most critical elements in the planning and successful execution of any
military action is command and control (C2). Sound command organization or
structure is one of the prerequisites for successful C2. Optimally, command organization should be centralized but at the same time allow for sufficient freedom
of action by subordinate commanders. This combination can be accomplished
by having intermediate levels of command and by applying faithfully, at all levels of command, the German-style mission command. Command organization
should delineate clearly the authority and responsibilities among commanders
at all levels.
Germany’s Kriegsmarine was a highly centralized organization. Raeder argued
(correctly) that high headquarters has all the information, the necessary communications facilities, knowledge of enemy radio traffic, and full control of the
supply organization.53
Raeder was CINC of the navy, head of the Oberkommando der Marine (Naval High Command), and chief of the SKL. The SKL was responsible for planning and conducting naval warfare beyond home waters. It consisted of several
departments, with the 1st, or Operations, Department (1./SKL) being the most
important.54
The Flottenkommandant (fleet commander) was a four-star admiral. As in the
Imperial German Navy, the fleet commander was the highest operational commander for surface forces. He was embarked aboard a flagship.55 Subordinate to
the fleet commander were various type-force commanders. The fleet commander’s position was weakened greatly when Marinegruppekommandos (naval group
commands) were established, the first being Naval Group Command East, established in Kiel, Germany, in November 1938. It was disbanded in August 1940 and
merged into Naval Group Command North on August 8, with headquarters in
Wilhelmshaven-Sengwarden.56 Naval Group Command North was responsible
for all Kriegsmarine activity in the Baltic Sea, the German Bight, Denmark, and
Norway.57 Naval Group Command West was established at WilhelmshavenSengwarden in August 1939. Initially it was responsible for operations in the German Bight, North Sea, and Atlantic Ocean. Its headquarters was moved to Paris
in August 1940. The responsibilities of Naval Group Command West for operations in the German Bight and the North Sea were transferred to Naval Group
Command North. Naval Group Command West retained operational control in
the Atlantic and became responsible for operations in the English Channel, Bay
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of Biscay, and Southwest Approaches (to the British Isles).58 The establishment
of naval group commands transferred ashore the operational control of seagoing
forces, in essence reducing the fleet commander to a tactical commander in combat.59 During the Bismarck operation, the commander of Naval Group Command
North was Admiral Rolf Carls (1885–1945), while Naval Group Command West
was commanded by Admiral Alfred Saalwächter (1883–1945).60
The German U-boat arm was established officially on September 27, 1935.
After January 1936, U-boats were led by the Führer der Unterseeboote (leader of
U-boats), with a rank of navy captain; on October 17, 1939, the position was elevated to Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote (commander of U-boats) (B.d.U.), with
a rank of rear admiral.61 At the time of the Bismarck foray, the B.d.U. was Admiral
Karl Dönitz (1891–1980). He was directly subordinate to the SKL.
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord of the
Admiralty Albert V. Alexander (1885–1965). (His position was the equivalent of
today’s Secretary of the Navy in the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted
of five sea lords plus four other high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Staff was Admiral Dudley Pound (1877–1943). He was the highest naval
official responsible for naval operations. In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included operational planning and execution. The most
important Admiralty divisions were Plans, Operations, Trade, and Intelligence.
The work of the Plans and Operations Divisions was coordinated closely with the
Intelligence Division.62
The Naval Staff was created in 1917. The Plans Division was responsible for
making strategic and operational decisions. The Operations Division controlled
deployed naval forces in home waters and overseas. It was also responsible for
worldwide naval dispositions and day-to-day, even hour-to-hour, movements.
Naval area commands and overseas commands enjoyed almost total independence. Yet the Admiralty remained a focal point for the direction of fleet operations. The principal maritime theater for the British was the northern Atlantic.63
The Home Fleet, created in 1902, represented the largest operational level of
command in the Royal Navy. Its operating area was the waters around the British Isles. The Home Fleet was organized into a number of type-force commands,
with a flag officer leading each one. In September 1939, the main components of
the Home Fleet were the 2nd Battle Squadron; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
(BCS 1); the 18th Cruiser Squadron (CS 18); Rear Admiral, Submarines (2nd
Submarine Flotilla, 6th Submarine Flotilla); Vice Admiral, Carriers; 6th and
8th Destroyer Flotillas; and the Orkneys/Shetlands force. Another element that
played a significant role in the operation in question was Force H, established
in June 1940. It was based at Gibraltar and operated mainly in the western

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 97

9

12/4/18 11:13 AM

98

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 6

Mediterranean. It consisted of one carrier (Ark Royal), one battle cruiser (Renown), one light cruiser, and six destroyers.64
Another major element was Western Approaches Command, which was led
by a CINC, a four-star admiral. It was established in Liverpool, England, on
September 9, 1939. The Combined Operations Headquarters was moved from
Plymouth, England, to Liverpool on February 17, 1941. The main responsibility
of Western Approaches Command was the defense and protection of the transatlantic convoys and coastal shipping in the Western Approaches.
The Royal Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command was established in 1936. It
became the RAF’s only maritime arm after the Fleet Air Arm was transferred to
the Royal Navy in 1937. The main responsibility of the Coastal Command was to
defend the British (and later Allied) convoys from U-boat and Luftwaffe attacks.
In 1941, the principal subordinate commands of the Coastal Command deployed
on the British Isles were Number 15 Group, with headquarters in Liverpool;
Number 16 Group, at Chatham, in Kent, southeast England; and Number 18
Group, at Pitreavie Castle, near Rosyth, Scotland.65
The Opposing Commanders
The two highest commanders of the opposing seagoing forces in the operation
were the German fleet commander, Admiral Günther Lütjens (1889–1941), and
the British CINC of the Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey (1885–1971).
Lütjens was considered to be one of the ablest German admirals: highly intelligent, deliberate, and levelheaded in his assessment of situations and people.66 He
was dedicated, single-minded, stoical, and austere. There was no doubt that he
was a man of great personal courage and integrity.67 He was not a Nazi believer.68
Lütjens entered the Imperial Navy in April 1907 and graduated from its naval
academy. During World War I, he spent most of his time in torpedo boats, took
part in a series of raids against Dunkirk, and by 1917–18 was a torpedo flotilla
leader. During the 1920s, Lütjens commanded a battleship and a torpedo boat
flotilla.69 He was promoted to captain in July 1933 and served in the Naval Personnel Office. Through the rest of the 1930s, Lütjens commanded a light training
cruiser, served as chief of the Naval Personnel Office, and was Commander of
Torpedo Boats (which included destroyers).70 He was promoted to rear admiral
in October 1937 and vice admiral in January 1940. He was Commander, Scouting Forces and deputy to the fleet commander, Admiral Wilhelm Marschall
(1886–1976). In March 1940, Lütjens commanded the battleships Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau during the invasion of Norway in April–June 1940.71 He also was
briefly acting fleet commander during the campaign in Norway, when Marschall
fell sick.72 In July 1940, Lütjens became fleet commander. On September 1, 1940,
he was promoted to four-star admiral.73 Lütjens led a highly successful foray with
two battleships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) in January–March 1941 (Operation
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/6
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BERLIN). Admiral Raeder had high confidence and trust in Lütjens, greatly valuing his broad and diverse professional experience.74
Admiral John Tovey entered the Royal Navy at the age of fifteen. He was commanding officer of the destroyer Onslow in the battle of Jutland in 1916, during
which Onslow “single-handedly” attacked the German cruiser Wiesbaden; Tovey
successfully brought his badly damaged ship back to port.75 He spent most of
his subsequent career in destroyers. Tovey served as Rear Admiral, Destroyers,
Mediterranean Fleet in 1938, and then as Vice Admiral, Light Forces in 1940. He
was considered a natural leader.76 He was aggressive and acted with a great deal
of initiative. Admiral Andrew Cunningham (1883–1963), CINC of the Mediterranean Fleet—known as a strict disciplinarian—had a high opinion of Tovey’s
professional abilities; however, Admiral Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, had
a more ambiguous, if not a negative, view. Pound considered Tovey “difficult at
times and not overburdened with brains.”77 Tovey did what he thought was right;
he refused to kowtow to superiors; and he hated yes-men.78 Tovey had an awkward initial interview with Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965)
that almost cost him the job, but in the end he became CINC of the Home Fleet
largely because of the support of First Lord Alexander and Admiral Pound.79
Later Churchill found Tovey stubborn and wanted to get rid of him.80
Tovey took command of the Home Fleet on December 20, 1940. His appointment broke with tradition because he was a junior vice admiral; normally, the
CINC of the Home Fleet was a senior four-star admiral or admiral of the fleet.81
Tovey immediately began intensive training in night fighting, both in conducting
air attacks and in defending against enemy air attacks.82
Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville (1882–1949) was in command of Force
H. His naval career as a commissioned officer began with service in the armored
cruiser Sutlej. He became a specialist in wireless telegraphy. During World War
I, Somerville served in the battleship Marlborough, battleship Queen Elizabeth,
battle cruiser Inflexible, and cruiser Chatham. He was promoted to captain in
1921. Throughout the 1920s, he served as Deputy Director of Signals at the Admiralty, next commanded the 4th Battle Squadron and the battleship Benbow,
and then returned as Director of Signals. In 1931, Somerville commanded the
cruiser Norfolk in the Home Fleet. Somerville was promoted to commodore in
1932 and a year later to rear admiral. He served as Flag Officer, Destroyers in
1936. After being promoted to vice admiral in September 1937, he became CINC,
East Indies in July 1938. Because of illness Somerville retired in early 1939, but
was recalled to active duty late in the year. He was deputy to Admiral Bertram
Ramsay (1883–1945) during the Dunkirk evacuation. Somerville was appointed
commander of the newly established Force H on June 22, 1940.
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Operational Intelligence
In 1941, British signal intelligence (SIGINT) was not yet fully developed, and
the penetration of German codes was still in its infancy; in 1940, priority had
been given to cracking the Luftwaffe’s codes because they were readily accessible.
Also, the Battle of Britain, not war in the North Atlantic, was the most immediate
threat. The Kriegsmarine was very careful in coding its radio messages, and used
a very sophisticated, almost impenetrable version of the Enigma machine. The
British did not achieve even isolated breakthroughs in Kriegsmarine radio traffic
until 1940, and the most important breakthrough was achieved in June 1941—
after the sinking of Bismarck. Until then, British SIGINT contributed only direction finding (DF) of German naval radio transmissions and some traffic analysis.83
This SIGINT was supplemented with air reconnaissance of German naval
bases and shipyards. The Royal Navy did not have land-based reconnaissance
aircraft to reconnoiter German naval bases in the Baltic such as Gotenhafen, so
it depended on the RAF to perform that function. However, the RAF generally
was reluctant to divert any resources from its strategic bombing efforts; it did not
want to risk its aircraft on naval targets. Therefore photoreconnaissance contributed little to the operational intelligence available.84
The British Special Intelligence Service (SIS) had an extensive network
of agents, mostly resistance fighters and Western sympathizers in Germanoccupied countries. SIS agent reports provided critically valuable information on
enemy naval movements.85 The British apparently had many agents in Norway
who reported on German military activities. They used shortwave transmitters
to communicate with their contacts in London.86
The Germans’ principal sources of information on British forces and their
movements were the Kriegsmarine’s naval intelligence radio-intercept service,
known as B-Dienst, and the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance aircraft. B-Dienst teams
also were deployed aboard major surface combatants, including those of the
Bismarck group. By September 3, 1939, B-Dienst had broken the major British
merchant and naval operational codes, and thus was able to track British naval
movements. However, changes to the British codes in August 1940 reduced BDienst’s effectiveness in this area. Still, by October 1940 B-Dienst could read
some 30 percent of British signals, and by January 1941 it again had mastered the
British code system.87
Photo and visual air reconnaissance was the responsibility of the Luftwaffe;
however, it generally was not very receptive to Kriegsmarine requirements. Its
aircraft lacked the endurance to conduct long-range missions—few Luftwaffe
aircraft could fly over British bases. Luftwaffe personnel also lacked the training
necessary to conduct visual recognition of naval targets.88
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THE GERMAN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
The SKL and Naval Group Commands North and West prepared a number
of studies on the employment of heavy forces in the conduct of Atlantikkriegführung. These studies served as the basis on which the SKL and naval group
commands drafted operative Weisungen (operational instructions); a fleet commander issued Operationbefehle (operations orders).
On April 2, 1941, Admiral Raeder issued operational instructions to the fleet
commander, the commanders of Naval Group Commands North and West, and
the Commander of U-boats on the conduct of war in the Atlantic. He pointed
out how tactical successes in the North Atlantic could have strategic effects on
the war in the Mediterranean and the southern Atlantic. The most decisive effect
on the war in the Atlantic would come from cutting off traffic between North
America and Britain across the North Atlantic.
Raeder recognized that the numerically inferior German forces could not
achieve sea dominance over the North Atlantic readily; however, he hoped the
Germans could obtain local and limited control, and thereby gain sea dominance
gradually. Raeder believed the enemy would be forced to strengthen significantly
the defenses of his convoys, at the price of weakening his position in home waters and the Mediterranean or reducing the frequency of convoys.89 Employing
Germany’s heavy ships over a wide ocean area would force the enemy to fragment
his naval strength. This, in turn, would allow the Germans to mass forces against
enemy weak points.90
However, Raeder’s concept was deeply flawed. Even if the Germans were able
gradually to obtain sea control in the North Atlantic, they could not maintain it
for very long.
German Plans
In his operational instruction issued on April 2, Raeder envisaged the employment of four battleships against enemy shipping in the Atlantic: Bismarck and
Tirpitz from Gotenhafen and Gneisenau and Scharnhorst from Brest.91 They
would join up in the North Atlantic and operate against convoys. The assumption was that the British would be forced to suspend convoys, and even might be
forced to withdraw their battleships from the Mediterranean.92 These hopes were
crushed when Gneisenau was torpedoed on April 6 and Scharnhorst experienced
such serious machinery problems that it would not be available until the end
of June. The British air raids on Kiel led to further delays in repairs to Admiral
Scheer and Admiral Hipper; Admiral Scheer would not be available until the
end of July, Admiral Hipper until August. The first German aircraft carrier, the
33,550-ton Graf Zeppelin, was eight months away from completion.93 Tirpitz was
undergoing sea trials and would not be operational by May 1941.
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Raeder made a difficult decision: to employ Bismarck and the heavy cruiser
Prinz Eugen alone. As a result, instead of being a part of a much larger effort,
Bismarck’s foray became an isolated operation. This, in turn, greatly increased the
risk, because the enemy would be able to concentrate all available forces against
the Bismarck group.94
The SKL issued the final operational instruction for RHEINÜBUNG on April 14,
1941. At his meeting with Hitler on April 20, Admiral Raeder pointed out that
the first, similar operation in the North Atlantic, conducted by the battleships
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst in January–March 1941, had been a significant tactical success. Moreover, it had considerable strategic effect in the Mediterranean
and South Atlantic.95 He also claimed that commerce warfare was proceeding
successfully.96 Raeder informed Hitler that the next battleship operation, by
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen, would be conducted in late April. The Pan-American
Security Zone would be respected.97 Hitler, while not rejecting the plan, had great
misgivings about it; yet he left it to Raeder to make the final decision.98 Raeder
emphasized to Hitler that dangerous conditions existed at Kiel and Wilhelmsha
ven, and at Brest as well, where German ships went for repairs after their forays
into the Atlantic. Hence, Brest shipyard would be used only in exceptional cases;
it was important to acquire use of the Spanish port of El Ferrol. Hitler promised
to secure that port for German ships in the fall of 1941. He also asked Raeder to
explore whether Organisation Todt could be used to build a large dry dock at
Trondheim quickly.99
Admiral Lütjens issued his operations order on April 22, 1941. Four days
later, Lütjens had a meeting with Raeder to discuss the timing of the operation.
Lütjens argued that the operation should be delayed until the damages Prinz
Eugen had suffered when it ran into a mine were repaired.100 He also suggested
that Bismarck might sail out alone, to be followed by Prinz Eugen, or that both
ships delay sortieing until the next new moon.101 Lütjens further believed that
the operation’s chances of success would be much greater if the combat group’s
sortie was delayed until either Scharnhorst was repaired or Tirpitz became fully
operational; the latter had been commissioned in February but, as mentioned,
was still undergoing sea trials. He presciently told Raeder that any employment
of Bismarck alone would trigger a massive response from the enemy, reducing the
chances of success. Lütjens and Raeder also discussed the use of Brest after the
completion of the operation, with Raeder stating that any stay at the French port
should be short, only to embark munitions and supplies. If Bismarck were heavily
damaged, it should steer to Saint-Nazaire instead; for a longer pause or overhaul,
Bismarck should head directly for home port. Lütjens stressed the importance of
air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait to locate the ice boundary and any enemy patrols. He also requested that Raeder assign a larger number of aircraft and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/6
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U-boats, plus fishing steamers, to support the operation. Raeder concurred, and
gave corresponding orders to his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Otto Schniewind
(1887–1964).102 Raeder later praised Lütjens for being so open with him, even
though the fleet commander did not accept Raeder’s reasoning entirely.103 Lütjens
had a premonition that Bismarck’s foray would end badly. After meeting with
Raeder, he stopped briefly in the office of the future rear admiral Hans Voss and
reportedly said, “I’d like to make my farewells. I’ll never come back.” He added,
“Given the superiority of the British, survival is improbable.”104
Raeder’s operational instruction of April 14 stated that the aufgabe (task) of
the fleet commander was to attack the enemy supply traffic in the Atlantic north
of the equator.105 The situation would determine the duration of the operation.106
The primary aim was to destroy the largest volume of enemy shipping, particularly that destined for British ports.107
The operations order that Lütjens issued on April 22 stipulated that the group’s
tasks were to sail through the Belts (the Danish straits) and the Arctic Ocean into
the Atlantic, then attack shipping traffic in the northern Atlantic. Afterward, the
group was to sail to a French port to replenish ammunition and supplies. If longer
repairs or an overhaul were needed, the ships were to return to home port in Germany.108 Originally, the operation was planned to start on April 28, to coincide
with the new moon; however, it was delayed until May 18 because of the mine
damages to Prinz Eugen and to conduct crane repairs on Bismarck.109
The forces initially assigned to support the operation consisted of several Luftwaffe squadrons and several U-boats, plus a number of logistical support ships.
The commander of the 5th Air Fleet, General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968),
was informed about RHEINÜBUNG, and that all available aircraft in Denmark
and Norway were to provide continuous fighter cover and a close A/S defense
screen, as well as reconnaissance of the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean to the
limits of the various aircrafts’ effective ranges. They also were to reconnoiter the
British naval base at Scapa Flow. Air Leader Stavanger assigned the responsibility for reconnaissance to 1st Squadron, 120th Aufklärungsgruppe (Reconnaissance Group) (designated 1. / F 120), reinforced by one squadron of the 121st
Reconnaissance Group (F 121), which flew Junkers (Ju) 88s. Also deployed in
support of the Bismarck group were naval flying boat squadrons and Heinkel
(He) 115 squadrons; these were based in Norway, concentrated in the Skagerrak–
Trondheim area. Two reconnaissance squadrons of Ju-88s and 1. / F 120 monitored Scapa Flow continuously. They also provided continuous coverage of the
North Sea and the Arctic. Parts of the 30th Kampfgeschwader (Battle Wing) (KG
30), flying Ju-88s, and the 26th Battle Wing (KG 26), flying He-111s and based in
Denmark and Kristiansand and Gardermoen, Norway, were put in combat readiness. Fighter protection was provided by Fighter Leader Norway.110
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GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE (PLANNED), APRIL 22, 1941
(F = flagship)
MAIN FORCES
Fleet commander: Admiral Günther Lütjens
1 battleship: Bismarck (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Prinz Eugen

SUPPORTING FORCES
6 U-boats (2 operating on north–south route, 4 operating on HX route [Halifax, Nova Scotia–U.K. ports])
2 reconnaissance ships (Gonzenheim, Kota Penang)
2 supply ships (Ermland, Spichern)
4 requisitioned tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, Esso-Hamburg, Friedrich Breme)
4 weather-observation fishing steamers (Freese, München, August Wriest,
Lauenberg)
2 mine breakers (Sperrbrecher 13, Sperrbrecher 31)
5th Minesweeper Flotilla (M-4, M-23, M-31, M-201, M-202, M-205, M-251,
M-252, M-253)
6th Destroyer Flotilla (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])

5TH AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER STAVANGER
2 reconnaissance squadrons (1. / F 120 [Ju-88s] Stavanger, 1. / F 121 [Ju-88As])
2 battle wings (KG 30 [Ju-88As] Eindhoven, KG 26 [He-111Hs] Stavanger-Sola)

3RD AIR FLEET, AIR LEADER ATLANTIC
5 battle wings (II. / KG 1 [Ju-88As] Rosières-en-Santerre, I. / KG 28 [He-111s]
Nantes, KG 40 [FW-200s/Ju-88As] Bordeaux-Mérignac, II. / KG 54
[Ju-88As] Bretigny, I. / KG 77 [Ju-88As] Juvincourt)
1 combat group (KG 100 [He-111Hs], Vannes-Meucon)
2 coastal air groups (KG 406 [He-115s] Hourtin/Brest, KG 506 [Ju-88As]
Westerland)
Sources: Operationsbefehl des Flottenchefs für die Atlantikoperation mit “Bismarck”
und “Prinz Eugen” (Deckbezeihnung: “Rheinübung”), April 22, 1941, pp. 40–41; Jürgen
Rohwer and Gerhard Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea, 1939–1945, 2nd ed.
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 63–64.

But air support of the Bismarck group during its movement from Bergen to the
Denmark Strait turned out to be very inadequate. The Luftwaffe lacked sufficient
numbers of reconnaissance aircraft to provide comprehensive coverage in an area
as distant as the Denmark Strait or the Iceland–Faeroes passage. In contrast, the
Luftwaffe provided gap-free reconnaissance of the central and northern parts
of the North Sea. It also envisaged full air cover for the Bismarck group during
its operational deployment from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord (an inlet in the
Korsfjord, near Bergen).111 The North Atlantic west of longitude 30 degrees W
was free of German aircraft, except for sporadic reconnaissance aircraft; however,
Luftwaffe aircraft covered the entire sea area east of longitude 30 degrees W.112
Generally, on a daily basis one or more Focke-Wulf (FW) 200s from Bordeaux or
Stavanger conducted reconnaissance of the sea area northwest of Ireland out to
approximately longitude 20 degrees W.113 Coastal reconnaissance was conducted
from bases at Brest and Hourtin, France (some thirty-two miles northwest of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss1/6
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Bordeaux), out to longitude 11 degrees W, or variously out to two hundred nautical miles, with He-111s; extension out to longitude 20 degrees W using He-111s
and Blohm & Voss 138s was in preparation. Additionally, two reconnaissance
ships (Gonzenheim and Kota Penang), plus some U-boats, were deployed some
three hundred nautical miles south of Cape Farewell, Greenland, the southern
entrance to the Denmark Strait.114
Initially, four U-boats were assigned to cooperate with the Bismarck group.115
One was assigned to conduct weather observation in the area between latitudes
55 and 60 degrees N and between longitudes 20 and 25 degrees W.116 Admiral
Lütjens’s April 22 operations order stated that activity in the operating area
would include some U-boats operating on the north–south convoy route and
four others on the HX convoy route (which ran from Halifax, Nova Scotia,
Canada, to U.K. ports) after the end of May, plus two reconnaissance ships and
five tankers.117
Available to Naval Group Command West were one supply ship; three requisitioned tankers carrying fuel, munitions, and food; and three tankers in reserve.118
Assigned for logistical support of RHEINÜBUNG were two supply ships (Ermland
and Spichern) and four (originally five) tankers (Lothringen, Belchen, EssoHamburg, and Friedrich Breme).119 The support ships were deployed in waiting
positions in the North Atlantic: one supply ship (Ermland) between the Azores
and the Lesser Antilles, and the other (Spichern) four hundred nautical miles west
of Faial, Azores; and the tankers Belchen and Lothringen some 120 and 200 nautical miles, respectively, south of Cape Farewell. One tanker (Esso-Hamburg) was
deployed some 450 nautical miles (nm) northwest, and another (Breme) about
seven hundred nautical miles southwest of Faial.120
Naval Group Command North would exercise control over the Bismarck
group until it crossed a line running from the southern tip of Greenland to the
northern tip of the Hebrides, when control would pass to Naval Group Command West.121 Thereafter Naval Group Command West would control the entire
operation, with tactical control residing in the hands of Admiral Lütjens aboard
Bismarck.122
Admiral Lütjens was responsible for the movement of reconnaissance ships,
supply ships, and tankers during their presence in the operating area. If breakout
into the Atlantic was detected too early, the operation was to be shortened or
aborted, depending on the situation. In such a case, either Naval Group Command West or the fleet commander would issue the order. If a sudden change in
the situation required withdrawal to the Arctic, Naval Group Command North
would make preparations for the arrival of the Bismarck group.123
Several U-boats (two at a minimum) would be deployed off Freetown, Sierra
Leone. Beginning in mid-June, up to four U-boats would be employed along
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the eastern part of the HX route between longitudes 30 and 45 degrees W. Both
groups would be subordinate to B.d.U., but if an opportunity arose for direct
cooperation, the fleet commander had authority to give orders directly to the
U-boats.124
RHEINÜBUNG was to consist of five distinct phases: (1) movement from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord; (2) movement from Grimstadfjord to the Denmark
Strait; (3) breakout into the North Atlantic; (4) attack on enemy shipping; and
(5) return to home base. The SKL instruction issued on April 14 directed the
Bismarck group to sortie from Gotenhafen in the afternoon of April 28. It would
advance through the Belts/Skagerrak, then to the Arctic.125 During the transit of
the Belts, defense against mines would be provided by Sperrbrecher (mine breakers) and the 5th Minesweeper Flotilla.126 During the group’s transit through the
Skagerrak, several destroyers would provide A/S protection.127
Lütjens’s operations order provided a very precise timeline for transiting the
Skagerrak and the Kattegat. This was necessary to coordinate properly the mine
countermeasures, A/S support, and Luftwaffe air cover. During the transit of
Arkona and the Skagen barrier, in addition to mine breakers / minesweepers,
four destroyers (Z-23, Z-24, Hans Lody [Z 10], and Friedrich Eckheldt [Z 16])
would provide the A/S screen for the Bismarck group.128 By 1900 on April 30, the
Bismarck group was to reach Kristiansand; at 0230 on May 1 it would reach the
latitude of Stavanger; at 0630 the same day, that of Korsfjord/Bergen; and on May
2, that of Trondheim.129
In operational terms, the planned movement of the Bismarck group from
Grimstadfjord to the Denmark Strait was an operational maneuver, followed by
a tactical penetration into the North Atlantic. The breakout was considered the
most difficult part of the entire operation. The aim was to enter the Atlantic unobserved by enemy patrols, but if the Bismarck group were sighted the mission
still was to be carried out to some extent, in accordance with the operational
instructions.130
The German leadership incorrectly assumed that enemy patrol forces in the
Denmark Strait would consist of auxiliary cruisers.131 However, it assumed correctly that enemy aircraft also would patrol the Denmark Strait. The Germans
knew that a bright night would make unobserved breakout more difficult,
whereas low visibility would facilitate breakout. They also assumed that the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance of the northern part of the North Sea would be sufficient
to provide an overview of the enemy situation.132
The ice boundary also influenced planning. Naval Group Command North
suggested to Lütjens that he execute the breakout between Iceland and the
Faeroes because those waters were ice-free. In contrast, the Denmark Strait is
narrow to begin with, and the width of the passage available varies with the
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position of the ice boundary, which had the potential to make it easier for enemy
ships to obtain and maintain contact with the Bismarck group. The enemy also
could draw on more-southward-deployed units. Another advantage of transiting
the gap was the shorter transit time, which saved fuel, whereas use of the strait
would require refueling. Unfortunately, Lütjens was bound to follow SKL instructions, which stipulated an undetected breakout through the Denmark Strait into
the Atlantic. Refueling would be provided by one tanker (Weissenberg), which
would wait at latitude 70 degrees N, longitude 01 degree W.133
After the successful breakout, searching for and destroying the largest volume
of enemy shipping would be the Bismarck group’s primary mission. In his operational instructions, Raeder directed that combat with an equally strong enemy
should be avoided.134 The only exception was if such an engagement would contribute to the accomplishment of the ultimate objective and the risk was low.135
The Gneisenau/Scharnhorst foray in January–March 1941 had shown that,
even when B-Dienst provided the departure date and route of an enemy convoy,
detecting those convoys in the broad spaces of the ocean depended on luck;
if it happened, it might be only by accident. In his operations order, Lütjens
explained that enemy convoys normally were escorted by one battleship, often
with two cruisers and two destroyers in addition. Bismarck would tie up the
battleship, while Prinz Eugen would deal with any other ships in the convoy’s
screen.136
Sailing to a French port would be considered only if no significant repairs were
required; if lengthier repairs were needed, each ship would return to its home
port.137 If needed, the general alternate port of return would be Trondheim.138
German Execution
Bismarck and Prinz Eugen possessed an unmatched power compared with their
respective enemy counterparts. However, the Home Fleet and Force H had an
enormous numerical superiority, plus effective support from RAF Coastal Command. (For details, see sidebars and map 1.)
The majority of supply ships and tankers sortied about a week prior to the
Bismarck group. The first to do so was the tanker Belchen from La Pallice on May
10; two reconnaissance ships sortied from La Pallice on May 17.139 Four tankers
and two supply ships would operate in the area between latitudes 45 and 46 degrees N and longitudes 32 and 35 degrees W. In the same area were deployed four
weather-observation fishing steamers.140 Two tankers sailed into the Arctic.141 If
bad weather delayed the Bismarck group breakout, one tanker was in a waiting
position in the Norwegian Sea, while another tanker was at Trondheim.142
Prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens stopped at Kiel to see his predecessor, Admiral Marschall. Marschall had been removed from his post because of
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MAP 1
BISMARCK COMBAT GROUP’S FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
Map 1: RHEINÜBUNG
BISMARCK COMBAT
GROUP’S
FORAY INTO THE ATLANTIC, MAY 18–27, 1941
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differences with Raeder and Naval Group Command West commander Admiral
Saalwächter. During the meeting, Marschall advised Lütjens not to follow instructions received from the SKL too literally. Marschall believed the fleet commander must have a certain freedom of action in case the situation changed.143
Lütjens responded in a tragically resigned tone: “No! Two fleet commanders
have already been relieved of their commands due to the displeasure of the Naval
[High] Command. I do not wish to be the third. I know what the Naval Command desires and will carry out their orders.”144
About one week prior to his arrival at Gotenhafen, Lütjens also visited his
friend and former “crew member” (classmate) Rear Admiral Conrad Patzig
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(1888–1975), the chief of the Personnel Office. Patzig asked why Lütjens had to
go on board as the fleet commander, because the operation was minor in scale,
yet the risk of losing his life was acute. Lütjens agreed with Patzig, but believed
there was no alternative.145 He did not want to question Raeder’s decision. As
mentioned, Lütjens apparently had a premonition of what would happen to him.
He told Patzig: “I shall have to sacrifice myself sooner or later. I have renounced
my private life and I am determined to execute the task which has been entrusted
to me in an honorable manner.”146
On May 12, Hitler met with Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (chief of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht),
and several high-ranking members of his staff visited Bismarck at Gotenhafen.
Raeder was not present. Hitler inspected the ship and attended gunnery exercises. He had a long talk with Lütjens. He asked the admiral about the Scharnhorst/
Gneisenau experience. Lütjens mentioned to Hitler the threat that enemy carrierborne torpedo aircraft posed to Bismarck.147
Phase I: Gotenhafen–Grimstadfjord (0000 May 18–0900 May 21). In operational
terms, the movement of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Grimstadfjord
represented the operational deployment.148 At about 0600 on May 18, Admiral
Lütjens received from naval intelligence the latest status of the enemy heavy
ships. The Germans estimated that in home waters were deployed three battleships (Prince of Wales, King George V, and Rodney), one battle cruiser (Hood),
and only one carrier (Victorious). One damaged carrier (Illustrious) was probably on the way to the United States. For a long time, there was no information
on the whereabouts of another carrier (Argus). Force H was in Gibraltar. On the
north–south convoy route were deployed one battleship (Repulse) and one carrier
(Furious) (used for ferrying aircraft from Britain to Gibraltar and the Gulf of
Guinea). One battleship (Nelson) and one carrier (Eagle) had left Durban, South
Africa, on May 10, but it was unclear whether they were organized as a group.149
During the forenoon of May 18, Admiral Lütjens issued his Absicht (intent)
for the pending operation. He stated that if the weather situation were favorable
for breaking out (i.e., it was bad), his intent was not to stop at Korsfjord but to
proceed directly to the Arctic, refuel from the waiting tanker Weissenberg, then
break out into the northern Atlantic through the Denmark Strait at high speed.
He hoped that if reduced visibility and fog prevailed, an encounter with the enemy cruisers or auxiliary cruisers in the Denmark Strait could be avoided. In the
case of an encounter with light forces, Prinz Eugen might use its torpedoes, on
order from Lütjens.150
At about 2130 on May 18, Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed from Gotenhafen.
They proceeded separately until they reached Arkona, where they joined up at
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1100 on May 19.151 On the order of the Befehlshaber der Sicherung der Ostsee
(Commander, Security Forces, Baltic), traffic in the Great Belt and Kattegat was
stopped for the night of May 19/20 and the morning of May 20, to enhance the
secrecy of the Bismarck group’s movement.152
During the morning of May 20, Luftwaffe photoreconnaissance ascertained
the presence in Scapa Flow of two battleships (King George V and Rodney), one
battle cruiser (Hood), one carrier (Victorious), six light cruisers, four destroyers,
and two submarines. In the northern Scotland area were probably twelve cruisers
that were nonoperational—under repair.153 No enemy forces were sighted in the
North Sea or the Arctic.
Around noon on May 20, the Bismarck group was in the vicinity of the Skagerrak mine barrier, to be escorted by the minesweeper flotilla; around 1600 it was
escorted through the mine-free area in the Kattegat. It then was mixed with
commercial vessels waiting to pass through the mine-free area in the reverse
direction.154 By evening, the Bismarck group was south of Kristiansand.155
At about 0620 on May 21, the 18th Air Group transmitted a message to the
British Admiralty concerning the presence of two enemy battleships and three
destroyers.156 B-Dienst decrypted this message almost immediately, and Naval
Group Command North and the SKL agreed that enemy agents had observed the
Bismarck group in the Great Belt.157
The original source of the information to the Admiralty about Bismarck’s transit was the Swedish cruiser Gotland.158 Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl
Petersén [1883–1963], head of Sweden’s C-Bureau, a unit for secret-intelligence
collection) passed the information to the British naval attaché in Stockholm,
Captain Henry Denham (1897–1993).159 In his message the naval attaché stated:
“Kattegat today 20th May (a) This afternoon eleven German merchant vessels passed Lenker North (b) at 1500 two large German warships escorted by
three destroyers, five escort craft, and ten to twelve aircraft passing Marstrand
[in the Bohuslän archipelago, in the northeastern Kattegat] course northwest
2058/20.”160 Raeder knew from Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), chief of
the Abwehr (Military Intelligence), that the signal from Stockholm was sent to
the Admiralty on the morning of May 21; Canaris had proof positive that British
agents had reported the Bismarck group’s movement.161
German naval intelligence learned that the report on the sighting of the Bismarck group had prompted intensive reconnaissance by the 18th Air Group. This
group, with headquarters near Rosyth, cooperated with CINC, Rosyth and the
Orkneys/Shetlands Naval Command. The B-Dienst intercepts located enemy
aircraft in the northern part of the North Sea, off the Norwegian coast, and in the
Faeroes area. Yet at the same time, monitoring of the radio traffic of the Home
Fleet revealed no sign of special activity.162
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At 0900 on May 21, the Bismarck group entered Korsfjord. Bismarck anchored
at Grimstadfjord, at the entrance to the Fjøsanger fjord. Prinz Eugen refueled at
Kalvanes Bay from a tanker.163 Surprisingly, Bismarck did not refuel, even though it
had burned some two thousand tons of oil since Gotenhafen.164 From enemy radio
transmissions, it was clear to the Germans that the enemy knew about the presence of the Bismarck group, although as noted no reaction had been detected.165
Coincidentally, the RAF planned to attack the Bismarck group during the night
of May 21/22. It also intended to conduct reconnaissance off the Norwegian coast
from Trondheim to Kristiansand on May 22.166 However, in both instances low
clouds prevented aircraft from finding their targets.167 In the evening on May 21,
British air reconnaissance ascertained that the Bismarck group had left Bergen.168
On May 21, Admiral Tovey decided to strengthen cruiser patrols in the
Denmark Strait and between Iceland and the Faeroe Islands.169 When the heavy
cruiser Suffolk arrived at Hvalfjord, Iceland, after being relieved by Norfolk in the
Denmark Strait, it was directed to rejoin CS 1 after refueling.170 To save fuel, Suffolk would join the patrol just before the earliest arrival of the enemy. The cruiser
Arethusa, due to arrive at Reykjavík, was directed to remain at Hvalfjord at the
disposal of Commander, CS 1.171 BCS 1 (Hood and Prince of Wales), plus a screen
of six destroyers (Electra, Anthony, Icarus, Echo, Achates, and Antelope), sailed
from Scapa Flow to Hvalfjord.172 Vice Admiral Lancelot E. Holland (1887–1941),
Commander, BCS 1, was instructed to cover patrols in the Denmark Strait and the
Iceland–Faeroes passage, operating north of latitude 62 degrees N.173 Tovey issued
orders recalling Repulse from the Clyde (where it was waiting to escort a convoy
to the Middle East) to Scapa Flow.174 The cruisers Birmingham and Manchester,
then patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, were directed to refuel at Skaalefjord
in the Faeroe Islands, then resume patrol.175 Their assigned patrolling line was between latitude 61 degrees N, longitude 10° 30ʹ W and latitude 64 degrees N, longitude 15 degrees W. Five fishing trawlers were on their routine patrols west of this
line. Arethusa was directed to join Manchester in the Iceland–Faeroes passage.176
During the evening of May 21, Admiral Max K. Horton (1883–1951), Rear
Admiral, Submarines, directed Minerve, then on patrol southwest of Norway, to
move to a position at latitude 61° 53ʹ N, longitude 03° 15ʹ E, while P-31 sailed out
from Scapa Flow to a position off Stadlandet (Selje, in the northwestern part of
Sogne Fjord).177
Phase II: Grimstadfjord–Denmark Strait (2200 May 21–2000 May 22). The
Bismarck group left Grimstadfjord at 2200 on May 21. Several hours afterward,
enemy aircraft searched for Bismarck in the skerries (small, rocky, uninhabited
islands) off Bergen. On the basis of this enemy activity, the Germans concluded
that the movement of the Bismarck group was known, but apparently the enemy
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was uncertain about the group’s exact location. At 0510, after the Bismarck
group reached the latitude of Kristiansund, Lütjens released the accompanying destroyers, which would proceed to Trondheim. On the basis of reports he
received, Lütjens believed that the major part of the Home Fleet was still at
Scapa Flow at noon on May 22. Even if the Home Fleet sailed out on May 22, it
would have to transit some 1,200 nautical miles to reach a position near Cape
Farewell.178
At 1200 on May 22, Lütjens directed the Bismarck group to increase its speed
to twenty-four knots and steer for the Denmark Strait.179 The group was then
some two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast.180 On the evening
of May 22, the sky was covered with clouds and the atmosphere was misty. The
meteorologist aboard Bismarck predicted that the weather would be favorable for
a breakout. Lütjens intended to steer for Cape Farewell.181 Possibly he was influenced by information he had received while at Korsfjord in the forenoon of May
21, from a Luftwaffe officer who told him there was no sign that the Home Fleet
had sailed from Scapa Flow. Lütjens probably believed that he must stay ahead of
the enemy. He was aware that the enemy knew about his sortie from Gotenhafen
and his stay in the skerries off Bergen.182
At 1939 on May 22, RAF aircraft reported that the enemy battleship and
cruiser, but not the merchant ships, had left Bergen. Three destroyers and one
catapult ship were sighted at Trondheim. Most of the Norwegian coast was then
under fog.183
After receiving a report at 2000 that the enemy warships had departed from
Bergen, Tovey believed there were four possibilities regarding enemy activity.
The first was that the convoy was carrying important military stores to northern
Norway and would sail through the Leads; for some weeks there had been reports
of movements of German troops to Kirkenes. The second possibility was that the
convoy was carrying a raiding party, perhaps to capture an airfield to support an
attack on Reykjavík or Hvalfjord. Third, the enemy battleship and cruiser might
try to break out through the Denmark Strait to reach the trade routes, as German
ships had done in the past. However, breaking out through the passage between
Iceland and Scotland could not be ruled out, especially because the enemy had
stopped at Bergen. The fourth possibility was that the enemy ships already had
covered an important German convoy as far as the Inner Leads, and now might
be returning to the Baltic. Tovey considered the third scenario to be the most
likely, and made his dispositions accordingly.184
At 2043 on May 22, Tovey requested air reconnaissance of all passages between
Greenland and the Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, as well as any enemy forces
approaching Iceland. The aim was to detect enemy ships breaking out westward.
The Admiralty responded to Tovey’s request by directing subordinate commands
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to conduct reconnaissance of the Iceland–Faeroes gap, the Denmark Strait, the
Faeroes–Shetland gap, and the Norwegian coast.185 An additional air-patrol line
about 250 miles west of the Iceland–Faeroes passage also was established by
CINC, Western Approaches, Admiral Sir Percy Noble (1880–1955).186 The 15th
Air Group units on Iceland were directed to provide A/S cover for Hood and
Prince of Wales and to keep a close watch on the Denmark Strait.187 The Admiralty canceled the sailing of the carrier Victorious and battleship Repulse, which
had been assigned to protect pending Convoy WS8B, and put these warships at
Admiral Tovey’s disposal. Victorious was then at Scapa Flow, while Repulse was
directed to sail from the Clyde to Scapa Flow.188
Phase III: Breakout to the Northern Atlantic (2000 May 22‒1922 May 23). On
May 23, the Bismarck group continued on a course to transit the Denmark Strait.
The weather was favorable for penetration: an easterly wind, overcast skies,
moderate-to-heavy rain, and moderate-to-bad visibility (650 feet or less).189
Overall, the situation for a breakout was considered favorable. However, that
same bad weather prevented Luftwaffe aircraft from reconnoitering Scapa Flow
on May 23.190 The Germans also did not have aircraft available to reconnoiter the
area between Iceland and the Faeroes.191 Lütjens ordered an increase in speed to
twenty-seven knots.192 In the meantime, Tovey’s Battle Force proceeded northward to latitude 60 degrees N—far enough to be in a position to deal with either
an attack on Iceland or a breakout.193
Also on May 23, Headquarters RAF Iceland received a message from CINC,
Western Approaches via Flag Officer in Charge, Iceland to give priority to reconnoitering the Denmark Strait, especially the Akureyri area of Eyja Fjord, in
north-central Iceland. A crossover patrol of the Denmark Strait from Iceland to
the limit of the ice already had been ordered.194 But only two air sorties of the
Iceland–Faeroes gap were carried out, because of the bad weather, and there was
no air reconnaissance of the Denmark Strait; however, Admiral Tovey did not
become aware of this until much later.195 Tovey directed Suffolk to patrol within
RDF range of the ice-edge boundary in the Denmark Strait.196 When conditions
were clear inshore, Norfolk would patrol about fifteen miles abeam of Suffolk;
when thick inshore, Norfolk would patrol to cover the inshore passage.197
Repulse and three destroyers from Western Approaches Command joined the
Battle Force northwest of the Butt of Lewis, Outer Hebrides, during the forenoon of May 23.198 Tovey intended to detach two cruisers to patrol the Faeroes–
Shetlands passage; however, in the end he decided to keep all four cruisers with
him.199
By noon, the Bismarck group reached the ice boundary.200 At 1427, the weather
forecast for the area north of Iceland was for southeasterly-to-easterly winds,
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wind force 6 to 8, mostly overcast, rain, and moderate-to-poor visibility; in the
area south of Iceland, it was for winds of force 5 to 7; cloudy to overcast; a lowpressure system east of Iceland; and warm air moving toward the Denmark Strait
and the area south of Iceland.201
At 1700, the weather in the vicinity of the Bismarck group was snow showers,
with visibility of around five thousand yards.202 The Bismarck group sailed near
the ice boundary. On its starboard side there was good visibility, while to port
there was fog.203 After entering the Denmark Strait shortly before 1900, the Bismarck group moved into an area of pack ice, with some floating icebergs, a few of
which were of enormous size. Thus, on May 23, the width of the ice-free passage
in the Denmark Strait was only about twenty nautical miles.204 Both Bismarck and
Prinz Eugen were zigzagging.205
German knowledge of the situation in the Denmark Strait and its approaches
was very spotty because of the lack of sufficient FW-200 aircraft. The last report
that Lütjens received was provided on May 19 by a single FW-200. The aircraft reported the ice boundary to be seventy to eighty nautical miles away from Iceland.
The same day, at a distance of some fifty nautical miles northwest of North Cape,
Iceland, another FW-200 had aborted its flight after encountering dense fog.206
At 1922, Suffolk sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen at a distance of 12,320
yards and steering on a southwesterly course. The Bismarck group’s position was
then some sixty miles northwest of North Cape.207 At the same time, Prinz Eugen
sighted what it believed to be an auxiliary cruiser at a distance of 14,200 yards.
Bismarck fired five salvos but scored no hits. The enemy ship disappeared.208 Suffolk used mist as a cover and maintained contact with Bismarck.209 At the time of
initial contact, Tovey’s Battle Force was at latitude 60° 20ʹ N, longitude 13 degrees
W. It turned to course 280 and increased speed to twenty-seven knots. Tovey’s
intent was to reach a position from which he could intercept the enemy east of
the Denmark Strait and at the same time support BCS 1. As more information
was received, it became clear that the enemy intended to break out through the
Denmark Strait.210
At 2028, Suffolk sighted Bismarck again near the ice boundary, at a distance of
twelve thousand yards. Four minutes later, Norfolk also made contact with Bismarck at a distance of 10,560 yards.211 The Admiralty received Norfolk’s message
at 2103, before it received Suffolk’s.212 Bismarck opened fire, but Norfolk retired
safely behind a smoke screen.213 The Bismarck group’s repeated attempts to break
off contact failed.214 The B-Dienst personnel aboard both Bismarck and Prinz
Eugen deciphered Suffolk’s signal (“one battleship, one cruiser, bearing 330°, distance 6 nautical miles, course 240°”) within minutes.215 However, they mistook
Norfolk’s call sign for that of King George V.216
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Lütjens was surprised at encountering enemy cruisers in the Denmark Strait.
However, for some reason he did not draw the proper conclusion: that the enemy
would try to block his foray into the Atlantic. He believed the British ships were
not equipped with advanced search radars; however, Suffolk had been fitted with
advanced artillery radar (Type 284/285).217 Suffolk’s radar now had an effective
range of 26,250 yards.218 In contrast, Norfolk had the older-model artillery radar
(Type 286M).219 Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were fitted with search radar; however, they lacked the accurate gunfire director, and hence were unable to drive off
shadowers using “blind” fire.220
At 2200 on May 23, the B-Dienst intercepted a message sent by a British unit,
probably a heavy cruiser, reporting that it had detected in the Denmark Strait, at
a distance of six nautical miles, one enemy battleship and one cruiser, both sailing
in a southwesterly direction.221 The B-Dienst also learned that CINC, Western
Approaches had issued a radio warning to three convoys about the possibility
of encountering enemy ships.222 These German radio intercepts revealed urgent
messages being sent to the enemy heavy units.223
Norfolk and Suffolk shadowed the Bismarck group throughout the night of May
23/24. The weather was characterized by rain and mist and the visibility was as low
as two miles. The ships “shadowed by sight and/or RDF according to visibility.”
Norfolk kept farther south and east “to cover move of enemy away from ice.”224
Phase IV: Encounter in the Denmark Strait, 0538‒0613 May 24. BCS 1 (Hood
and Prince of Wales) and its screen arrived at their assigned position at about
0205—sooner than Tovey had anticipated. Both ships turned to a course parallel
to that of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.225 At 0200, Admiral Holland detached his
destroyers because CS 1 had lost contact with Bismarck. This was a serious error,
though, because he lost the opportunity to launch torpedo attacks on the German
ships.226 During the rest of the night, Prince of Wales obtained positions by using
RDF information from Norfolk and Suffolk.227
At 0538, Suffolk again regained contact with the Bismarck group.228 At 0545,
the Bismarck group’s B-Dienst detachment identified two enemy units: Hood
and a battleship of the King George V class (actually Prince of Wales). The enemy
ships were at a distance of 31,700 yards and sailing at high speed. At 0552, Hood
opened fire at a range of 25,000 yards. Two minutes later both German ships
responded.229 They concentrated their fire on Hood.230 The running combat distance varied from 19,650 to 22,750 yards.231 The fire of both Bismarck and Prinz
Eugen was excellent. Hood was hit by the second or third salvo, which started
fires aboard that spread rapidly.232 At 0600, Hood was straddled again. There was
a huge explosion and Hood blew up.233 It sank in three to four minutes.234 Hood
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had been able to fire only five or six salvos.235 Out of a ship’s company of ninetyfive officers and 1,324 men, only three survived.236
After the sinking of Hood, Prince of Wales engaged Bismarck. Both Prinz Eugen
and Bismarck shifted their fire onto Prince of Wales. The firing range was reduced
to eighteen thousand yards. Within two minutes, Prince of Wales was hit with
four 15-inch shells and probably three 8-inch shells. Its salvos now were falling
short and had a very large spread. Hence, Captain John Leach, the commanding
officer of Prince of Wales, decided to break off the engagement.237 By then the
range had been reduced to only 14,600 yards.238 At 0613, Prince of Wales turned
away under a smoke screen.239 The ship had two guns out of action and considerable damage to its bridge.240 Yet it had performed well, even though its crew was
only partly trained.241 Bismarck had received two heavy and one light hits. It left
a trail of oil from one of its tanks.242
At 0632, Lütjens sent a signal to Naval Group Command North informing it
that one battle cruiser, probably Hood, had been sunk, while one battleship, either
King George or Renown, was damaged and had withdrawn. Two enemy heavy
cruisers maintained contact with Bismarck. In the meantime, B-Dienst decrypted
a series of messages sent by Suffolk and Norfolk.243
Lütjens’s Fateful Decision. Admiral Lütjens made the decision not to pursue the
damaged Prince of Wales. Perhaps the main reason was that continuing the engagement would have required sailing at higher speed, resulting in higher fuel
consumption. This would have had an especially negative effect on Prinz Eugen,
because of its shorter range. Lütjens also was probably unsure whether he could
destroy Prince of Wales as quickly as he had Hood. Moreover, his principal mission was to destroy enemy shipping, not the enemy’s heavy surface ships.244
After sinking Hood, Lütjens could steer to Bergen, Trondheim, or SaintNazaire to attend to the damages he had suffered in the Denmark Strait. The
route to Bergen ran between the Faeroes and the Shetlands, with a transit distance of 1,150 nautical miles. This was the shortest route and the fastest way to
reach an area where the Luftwaffe could provide effective cover. Its major drawback was that the Bismarck group would have to sail within the effective range
of many enemy aircraft and naval bases. The possibility existed that the Home
Fleet, based at Scapa Flow, might appear. These reasons made this route the most
dangerous for the Bismarck group to take.
The route to Trondheim ran either south of Iceland (approximately 1,300 nm) or
through the Denmark Strait (approximately 1,400 nm).245 The major advantage of
the route through the Denmark Strait was that the Bismarck group would sail into
an area of extensive low visibility and close to the ice boundary, making the threat
from enemy aircraft much smaller than on the other routes. However, the threat
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of encountering enemy heavy ships could not be excluded entirely. The Bismarck
group needed to make only seven hundred nautical miles good toward Trondheim
for the Luftwaffe to protect it effectively. This route also offered the best chance
of avoiding the main body of the Home Fleet if it made a foray into the Arctic.246
The route to Saint-Nazaire was about 1,700 nautical miles long—making it
the longest route—and more than two thousand nautical miles if the Bismarck
group made a temporary swing westward. A major disadvantage of this route was
that Bismarck would run the risk of encountering a large concentration of enemy
forces. But the advantage of this route was that the vast expanse of the North Atlantic might make it possible to shake off the shadowers. Another advantage was
that reaching Saint-Nazaire would offer Bismarck a much more favorable position
for conducting war in the Atlantic.247 A major disadvantage of this route was that
the enemy could use land-based and carrier-based aircraft to detect and attack
the Bismarck group, then concentrate his heavy surface ships to prevent Bismarck
from actually reaching Saint-Nazaire.
Lütjens chose to steer for Saint-Nazaire. We only can speculate about his
reasons. In any case, it is clear that once the element of surprise was lost the best
option was to cancel the entire operation and return home.248 Some SKL staffers
and the commanders of Naval Group Command North and Naval Group Command West argued that Lütjens should have been directed to return home, but
Raeder believed that such a decision should be left to Lütjens to make.249 A better
option for Lütjens would have been to pursue Prince of Wales, destroy it, then sail
for Trondheim via the Denmark Strait.
THE BRITISH OPERATIONAL REACTION
Operational Concentration, May 24‒25
The Admiralty broadcast CS 1 sightings of the Bismarck group on May 24.
Among other things, it directed Admiral Somerville to sail from Gibraltar with
Force H to join the convoy that Repulse was to have brought south of the Clyde,
which now had only the cruiser Exeter as an escort. At the same time, the Admiralty added that “should reconnaissance today (24th) indicate that one or
both German battle cruisers have left Brest it will be necessary you alter these
instructions.” The Admiralty also ordered CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and
Arethusa), which had been patrolling the Iceland–Faeroes passage, to join northeast of Langanes, Iceland, “in readiness to form a patrol line in event of enemy
breaking back.” It also arranged for air patrols with the same purpose.250
At 0800, the Battle Force was about three hundred miles away to the southeastward of the Denmark Strait and sailing at twenty-seven knots.251 Tovey believed
that the enemy, having sunk Hood, was unlikely to turn back. Hence, the best
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hope was to intercept Bismarck with the Battle Force. Tovey ordered a course
change to 260, then 240. The most unfavorable situation for the Home Fleet
would be if the enemy hugged the eastern coast of Greenland, then sailed toward
Norway’s western coast to take fuel from a waiting tanker. If that happened, Bismarck would be able to escape the pursuit by King George V.252 The Admiralty
directed Rear Admiral William F. Wake-Walker (1888–1945), commander of CS
1, to “continue to shadow Bismarck even if you run out of fuel, in order that the
commander in chief [Tovey] may catch up in time.”253
At 0801, Lütjens sent a repeat message to the SKL and both naval group commanders about the encounter in the Denmark Strait. He also reported that the
free fairway in the Denmark Strait was some fifty miles wide and contained
floating mines.254
After the engagement with Prince of Wales, the Bismarck group sailed on a
southwesterly course. Bismarck tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to shake off
the shadowers. Suffolk masterfully used RDF to maintain contact.255
In the meantime, the Admiralty made a series of tactical decisions to direct a
number of ships in the Atlantic to take part in the pursuit of Bismarck. Collectively these decisions resulted in an operational concentration. Rodney had sailed
from the Clyde on May 21 en route to Boston for refit, accompanying the troop
transport Britannia. The Admiralty gave the position of Bismarck and directed
Rodney to close in, leaving Britannia behind, with one destroyer to screen it.256
At 1022, Rodney, then some 520 miles west of Bloody Foreland, county Donegal,
Ireland, was directed to steer best course to close the enemy. Ramillies, which
was escorting Convoy HX127, was then a thousand miles south of the Bismarck
group; at 1144, it was ordered to leave the convoy and proceed to contact the enemy from the west.257 At 1234, the Admiralty ordered Revenge to sail from Halifax
and overtake Convoy HX128. The cruisers Edinburgh (then cruising near latitude
45 degrees N and longitude 21 degrees W) and London (escorting the 19,000-ton
troopship Arundel Castle from Gibraltar) received orders to “give up their task
and steer toward the enemy, husbanding fuel against future needs.”258
At 1340, the SKL and both naval group commanders received Lütjens’s message sent at 0801 on May 24. This was when they first learned about the outcome
of the encounter in the Denmark Strait, the extent of damage to Bismarck, and
Lütjens’s intent to sail for Saint-Nazaire.259
At 1400, the Bismarck group’s position was about 240 nautical miles northnortheast of Cape Farewell.260 Lütjens sent a signal to the SKL and the naval group
commanders that the battleship King George was maintaining contact with his
group. If there were no combat, his intent was to break off from the shadowers
during the night of May 24/25.261 At 1420, Lütjens directed Prinz Eugen to maintain its present course until three hours after Bismarck’s maneuver to the west to
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BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE, MAY 18, 1941
(F = flagship)
HOME FLEET
CINC, Home Fleet: Admiral Sir John C. Tovey
2 battleships: King George V (F) (at Scapa Flow), Rodney (en route from the
Clyde to Boston with Britannia)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (825 Sqdn) (at Scapa Flow, to escort Convoy
WS8B)

1ST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON (BCS 1)
Vice Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Squadron: Lancelot E. Holland
2 battle cruisers: Hood (at Scapa Flow), Repulse (at the Clyde, to escort
Convoy WS8B)
1 battleship: Prince of Wales (at Scapa Flow)

1ST CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 1)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 1: William F. Wake-Walker
2 heavy cruisers: Norfolk (on Denmark Strait patrol), Suffolk (refueling at
Reykjavík)

2ND CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 2)
Rear Admiral Commanding, CS 2: Neville Syfret
4 light cruisers: Aurora, Galatea, Kenya, Neptune (at Scapa Flow)

18TH CRUISER SQUADRON (CS 18)
Commodore C. M. Blackman
4 light cruisers: Manchester, Birmingham (on Faeroes–Iceland passage patrol);
Arethusa (en route to Reykjavík); Edinburgh (on patrol off the
Azores)

DESTROYERS
Inglefield, Intrepid (en route to Scapa Flow); Achates, Active, Antelope, Anthony, Echo, Electra, Icarus, Nestor, Punjabi (at Scapa Flow); Jupiter
(at Londonderry); Eskimo, Mishona, Somali, Tartar (at sea with Rodney and Britannia)

WESTERN APPROACHES COMMAND (Liverpool)
1 light cruiser: Hermione (en route to Scapa Flow to join CS 2)
5 destroyers (escorts for Repulse): Lance (at Scapa Flow); Assiniboine, Legion,
Saguenay (at the Clyde); Columbia (at Londonderry)

PLYMOUTH COMMAND
4th Destroyer Flotilla: Cossack, Maori, Sikh, Zulu; Piorun (Polish) (at the Clyde,
as escorts for Convoy WS8B)

NORE COMMAND
1 destroyer: Windsor (at Scapa Flow)

FORCE H (at Gibraltar)
Flag Officer Commanding, Force H: Vice Admiral Sir James F. Somerville
1 battle cruiser: Renown
1 aircraft carrier: Ark Royal (810, 818, 828 Sqdns)
1 light cruiser: Sheffield
5 destroyers: Faulkner, Foresight, Forester, Fury, Hesperus

AMERICA AND WEST INDIES COMMAND
2 battleships: Ramillies (escorting Convoy HX127), Revenge (at Halifax, Nova
Scotia)

SOUTH ATLANTIC COMMAND
1 heavy cruiser: Dorsetshire (escorting Convoy SL74)

SUBMARINES
Rear Admiral, Submarines: Max K. Horton (Aberdour / north London)
P-31 (at Scapa Flow); Sealion, Seawolf, Sturgeon (in English Channel); Pandora (en route from Gibraltar to United Kingdom); Tigris (at the
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Clyde); H44 (at Rothesay); Minerve (Q185) (French) (off Norway’s
southwestern coast)

RAF COASTAL COMMAND
No. 15 Group (Liverpool)
No. 16 Group (Chatham, Kent)
No. 18 (Pitreavie Castle, Scotland)
Sources: Training and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty,
London, “Appendix A: Bismarck Operations; List of H.M. Ships, C.B. 3081 (3),” in Battle
Summary No. 5, pp. 38–40; Schofield, Loss of the Bismarck, pp. 72–75; Air Marshal,
CINC, Coastal Command, “Dispatches of CINC Home Fleet on the Sinking of the Bismarck,” September 3, 1946, app. A, AIR 15/204, TNA; Müllenheim-Rechberg, Battleship
Bismarck (1980), pp. 264–67; Rohwer and Hümmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea,
pp. 63–64.

shake off the shadowers. Prinz Eugen then would refuel from a tanker (Belchen
or Lothringen). After receiving the signal “Hood,” it would operate independently
and conduct commerce raiding.262
At 1440, Dönitz issued an instruction to the U-boats to establish a patrol
line southeast of Cape Farewell. The aim was to lure enemy ships approaching
from the north. At that time, Lütjens’s intent was to operate in the area halfway
between Greenland and Newfoundland. The Bismarck group would carry out a
swing and lure pursuing enemy forces over the U-boat patrol line. The distance
of the U-boat patrol line from the British coast was about 1,400 nautical miles.263
The depth of the patrol line would be ten nautical miles. Dönitz ordered the Uboats to reach their assigned positions by 0600 on May 25.264
At 1445, the Admiralty requested that Admiral Wake-Walker provide information on the percentage of fighting effectiveness Bismarck retained and about
his intent to have Prince of Wales reengage. In his response at 1545, Admiral
Wake-Walker stated that he had no evidence that the damage the enemy had
received had reduced his speed at all. Wake-Walker also believed that the enemy
would not reengage but would try to avoid any combat.265 Wake-Walker also
stated that Prince of Wales “should not reengage until the other heavy ships are in
contact and unless interception fails; doubtful if she has speed to force action.”266
The reason for not reengaging Bismarck was that the cruisers of CS 1 might be
damaged and thereby forced to reduce their speed. This would make it impossible to maintain contact with Bismarck. Admiral Tovey believed that, under the
circumstances, Wake-Walker was justified in his decision. Tovey believed that his
forces were more likely ultimately to destroy Bismarck if he used the cruisers to
maintain contact until the approaching reinforcements arrived.267
At 1455, Tovey reported that Victorious, escorted by CS 2 (Galatea, Aurora,
Kenya, and Hermione), was detached to launch an aerial torpedo attack at about
2200, when within a hundred-mile range of the enemy.268 The aim was to reduce
Bismarck’s speed. Tovey believed that keeping Victorious with the Battle Force
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until the morning of the next day (May 25) would not be helpful in locating Bismarck if it had slipped away during the three hours of darkness. The remainder
of the Battle Force (King George V and Repulse) and its escorts steered an intercepting course. The aim was to bring the enemy to action soon after sunrise.269
At 1800, Tovey was with King George V, Repulse, Victorious, and two cruisers.270 CS 18 (Manchester, Birmingham, and Arethusa) was returning from a point
northeast of Iceland to Hvalfjord to refuel. The battleship Revenge left Halifax at
1505 to overtake Convoys HX128 and SC32. Admiral Somerville, with his Force
H (Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and a half dozen destroyers), was directed to
join Convoy WS8B after daylight on May 26.271
In the meantime, the shadowers shortened the distance to Bismarck. At 1830,
Bismarck opened fire on Suffolk. Prince of Wales fired several salvos at Bismarck
from thirty thousand yards. However, this brief encounter did not result in damage to any of the ships.272
At 1842, Naval Group Command West sent a radio message in which it agreed
with Lütjens’s intent to release Prinz Eugen to operate independently. It informed
Lütjens that preparations were under way at Saint-Nazaire and Brest to receive
Bismarck. It also suggested that if Bismarck successfully broke away from its
shadowers it should remain in its present isolated area.273 However, Bismarck’s
reduced speed made breaking off contact more difficult. Neither Raeder nor the
two naval group commanders knew whether Lütjens had considered the possibility of avoiding the enemy by moving northward, or which factors he had
considered when he selected Saint-Nazaire.274
At 2210, nine Swordfish torpedo bombers took off from Victorious; at 2300,
they were followed by three Fulmar fighters; at 2400, two more Fulmars took off.
The weather was showery with squalls, good visibility, and a northwesterly wind.
Sunset was at 0052.275 At about midnight on May 24/25, twelve aircraft (seven
Swordfish and five Fulmars) from Victorious carried out a torpedo attack on Bismarck; however, they claimed just one hit on the ship. This first air attack failed
to inflict any serious damage on Bismarck.276
In the meantime, at 2331, the Admiralty sent new orders to Force H “to steer
so as to intercept Bismarck from the southward. Enemy must be short on fuel, and
will have to make for an oiler; her future movements may guide to this oiler.”277
Loss of Contact with Bismarck, 0213 May 25
CS 1 lost contact with Bismarck at 0213 (Prince of Wales claimed this happened
at 0126) on May 25.278 Heretofore, despite frequent and abrupt changes in the
visibility, Norfolk and Suffolk had maintained contact with Bismarck skillfully for
thirty hours.279 When Tovey received the information that contact with Bismarck
was lost, he believed that the German battleship had three options: rendezvous
with a tanker, possibly off the east coast of Greenland or farther south, such as
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2019

Winter2019Review.indb 121

33

12/4/18 11:13 AM

122

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 72 [2019], No. 1, Art. 6

near the Azores or Canary Islands; make for a dockyard on the west coast of
France, or possibly an Italian port in the Mediterranean; or return to Germany
for repairs.280
At 0300, Force H was approximately 850 miles west of Porto, Portugal. Heavy
seas had delayed its progress.281 CS 2, with Victorious and four accompanying
cruisers, was directed to organize a search northwest of Bismarck’s last known position. Norfolk and Suffolk, after remaining at the enemy’s last known position for
some time, proceeded westward to cover the southwestern sector. Rodney, with
three destroyers, reported that it was steering to intercept the enemy if it showed
up in the southeastern sector. Repulse had yet to be detached to Newfoundland
to refuel, while Prince of Wales was directed at 0620 to join Tovey’s Battle Force.
The Admiralty directed London to search the area around latitude 25° 30ʹ N, longitude 42° W, where an enemy tanker was believed to be located.282
At 0800 on May 25, Bismarck was some one hundred miles astern of King
George V, sailing southeast.283 At 0854, Lütjens sent a message in which he erroneously stated that the enemy ships still were shadowing Bismarck. The sending
of this signal gave away his position to the British radio-intercept operators. At
1030, Tovey received from the Admiralty a series of DF fixes. They indicated that
the signals appeared to come from the same ship that had transmitted several
signals soon after the torpedo attack by aircraft from Victorious the previous
night (i.e., Bismarck). When these fixes were plotted incorrectly on King George
V, they showed a position too far north. This provided a misleading indicator
that the enemy was retreating northward toward the North Sea. This information confirmed Tovey’s existing belief that Bismarck was heading north.284 This
is why Tovey directed the entire Home Fleet to search to the north. King George
V changed course to 055, increased speed to twenty-seven knots, and headed
toward the Iceland–Faeroes passage.285 But Tovey’s decision was unsound.
The Admiralty, for its part, apparently was not entirely convinced that Bismarck was sailing northward. So at 1023 the Admiralty directed Admiral Somerville and CS 1 to proceed “on assumption that enemy turned towards Brest.”286
In another signal sent at 1100, the Admiralty signaled to Somerville to “act as
though the enemy is proceeding to a Bay of Biscay port.” The Admiralty had great
difficulty obtaining accurate information about the position of Bismarck. A DF
fix at 1320 located Bismarck at a position within fifty miles of 55° 15ʹ N, 32° W.
The Admiralty transmitted this information to Tovey at 1419, and he received
it at 1530. At 1428, the Admiralty directed Rodney to ignore the signal sent at
1108, which had directed the battleship to proceed in the direction of Brest, and
to comply with Tovey’s instructions that assumed Bismarck was proceeding to
Norway via the Iceland–Scotland passage. At 1621, Tovey sent a query to the
Admiralty: “Do you consider that enemy is making for Faroes.”287
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However, by the late afternoon and early evening of May 25 the Admiralty’s
view about Bismarck’s movements had changed in favor of the Bay of Biscay
destination. At 1805, the Admiralty canceled the signal it had sent to Rodney at
1428 and directed the ship to act on the assumption that the enemy was proceeding toward a French port. Finally, at 1924, the Admiralty informed Tovey and all
other forces that it believed Bismarck was heading toward a French port. Tovey
already had come to the same conclusion at 1810, when he decided to turn his
force onto a southeasterly course, heading toward the Bay of Biscay.288
Final confirmation came in the evening and from an unlikely source. General
Hans Jeschonnek (1899‒1943), the Luftwaffe chief of staff, sent a message to the
Naval High Command asking whether Bismarck would be coming into a French
port for repairs. (The reason for this might have been personal: Jeschonnek’s son
served in Bismarck.) This message was sent in the Luftwaffe’s Enigma code, and
hence was readable to the British decoders. Jeschonnek’s message was deciphered
quickly and passed on to the Admiralty, and at 1812 was sent to Tovey as well.
Tovey’s error had given Bismarck a chance to escape.289
In the meantime, at 1320 on May 25, Raeder briefed Hitler on Bismarck’s
situation. He reported that during the night of May 24/25 the enemy had maintained contact with Bismarck. Because the enemy used advanced radar, Bismarck
had not been able to break off contact. Near Bismarck were one battleship (King
George V), two heavy cruisers, and one carrier. Lütjens reported around midnight
on May 24 that Prinz Eugen had been detached for refueling in the mid-Atlantic.
This maneuver went unobserved by the enemy. Lütjens intended to reach SaintNazaire. All available U-boats and light naval forces would be used to support
Bismarck.290
At 1932, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens about pending
actions in support of Bismarck. Air units would be used during the approach
phase to a French port. Luftwaffe aircraft would conduct reconnaissance out to
longitude 15 degrees W. Bombers would be used out to longitude 14 degrees W.
Long-range reconnaissance would be conducted out to longitude 25 degrees W.
By 1313 on May 25, six U-boats had deployed to their assigned positions (see
map 1). The approaches to Brest and Saint-Nazaire would be strongly controlled.
There also was a possibility that Bismarck could return to the port of La Pallice.291
In the evening on May 25, Tovey still had Repulse in company with King
George V. Rodney was sailing on a southeasterly course toward the Bay of Biscay.
The Admiralty recalled Ramillies to rejoin Britannia and sail to Boston. At 2100,
CS 1 was at latitude 55° 50ʹ N, longitude 31° 28ʹ W. It sailed on a southeasterly
course (120) at twenty-six knots. It was some one hundred miles behind Tovey’s
Battle Force. However, it was low on fuel, with only fifty percent remaining. The
cruiser London proceeded to search for an enemy tanker halfway between the
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Azores and the Leeward Islands. On the morning of May 26, the cruiser Edinburgh’s fuel was at only 13 percent of capacity. That evening, Prince of Wales was
directed to sail to Iceland for refueling.292
At 0053 on May 26, Naval Group Command West reported that four FW-200s
would provide loose coverage between latitudes 43° 30ʹ N and 54° 25ʹ N and out
to longitude 25 degrees W. With additional aircraft they would provide heavier
coverage out to longitude 19 degrees W in the northern part and to longitude 14
degrees W in the southern part. Despite bad weather, the four FW-200s covered
their assignment. Because of the stormy weather it was not possible to send German destroyers to the area to relieve the enemy pressure on Bismarck.293
Bismarck’s situation worsened on May 26. That morning Bismarck was some
seven hundred nautical miles away from the French coast. Some thirty-one
hours had passed since the British cruisers had lost contact with Bismarck, but
now three British forces were converging on Bismarck, plus several single large
surface combatants. The 4th Destroyer Flotilla (Cossack, Sikh, Zulu, Maori, and
Piorun) was detached from Convoy WS8B. The ships were directed to join and
screen King George V and Rodney. One destroyer (Jupiter) at Londonderry was
directed to join the same screen. After receiving the first enemy report on the
morning of May 26, the cruiser Dorsetshire left Convoy SL74 and proceeded to
join the Battle Force.294
In the meantime, other British forces that were unable to reach Bismarck’s
most probable track moved to cover its alternative possible movements. Two light
cruisers (Manchester and Birmingham) of CS 18 patrolled within the Iceland–
Faeroes passage, while another light cruiser of the same squadron (Arethusa)
patrolled the Denmark Strait. Victorious and CS 2 were positioned to prevent
the enemy from gaining access to the Iceland–Faeroes passage. If necessary,
CS 2 would be detached to fuel at Hvalfjord. Prince of Wales was on the way to
Hvalfjord and destroyers were directed to screen both Prince of Wales and CS 2.295
Flag Officer Commanding, North Atlantic was instructed to arrange air and
submarine patrols to prevent passage of the Strait of Gibraltar. The battleship
Nelson was recalled from Freetown to Gibraltar to reinforce the forces converging on Bismarck. The cruiser London was recalled from its search for the enemy
tanker between the Azores and the Leewards and was directed to escort Convoy
SL75, which was approaching the Bay of Biscay. Suffolk was sent to search in
the Davis Strait (between Greenland and Canada’s Baffin Island) for the enemy
supply ships and tankers believed to be in the area and from which Prinz Eugen
might refuel.296
The Admiralty’s arrangement on May 25 provided for RAF commands to
cooperate by conducting reconnaissance from Iceland and the Faeroes to and
including the coast of Norway. Canadian aircraft conducted six-hundred-mile
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searches from Newfoundland. One of the American air squadrons based in Newfoundland also took part in the searches.297 Coastal Command established two
patrols across Bismarck’s probable track, from latitude 52° 19ʹ 30˝ N to 48 degrees
N, out to longitude 23° 30ʹ W.298
Contact with Bismarck Restored
Finally, at 1030 on May 26, Bismarck was detected some six hundred nautical
miles west of Land’s End, by a Catalina seaplane of Coastal Command based at
Plymouth.299 However, the Catalina lost contact because of antiaircraft (AA) fire
from Bismarck.300 Ark Royal launched two long-range aircraft to search for Bismarck.301 At 1114, an aircraft from Ark Royal reestablished contact with Bismarck.
Bismarck’s position was latitude 49° 20ʹ N, longitude 20° 50ʹ W, or forty miles
from the position the Catalina had reported some forty-five minutes earlier.302
After this point, Bismarck was kept under almost continuous surveillance for
the rest of the day.303 Visibility in the area was variable, the wind northwesterly
at force 7–8.304 Bismarck steered a southeasterly course at twenty-two knots. The
distance between Bismarck and Tovey’s Battle Force was too great to close unless
Bismarck’s speed could be reduced. This could be accomplished only by a torpedo
attack by Ark Royal’s aircraft. At 1052, the Admiralty directed Admiral Somerville not to have Renown engage unless Bismarck already was engaged heavily
with King George V or Rodney.305
A major and increasingly critical problem for the Home Fleet was the fuel
situation, especially regarding the battleships. King George V had only 1,200 tons
of fuel remaining, or 38 percent. Rodney had to part company at 0800 on May
27. When these ships joined the Battle Force, they had to share the A/S screen
provided by only three destroyers (Somali, Tartar, and Mishona)—and those destroyers had to leave that night for lack of fuel. The British suspected that there
were several U-boats in the area. They also assumed that every available enemy
destroyer and U-boat in western France would be ordered to sail out as well. The
Admiralty warned Tovey to expect heavy air attacks.306
Tovey considered it essential to have fuel reserves sufficient to allow battleships to return to their home bases. After the loss of Hood and the damage inflicted on Prince of Wales, King George V was the only effective battleship in home
waters. Tovey was not willing to expose King George V unscreened and sailing at
low speed to almost certain attack by U-boats unless there was a good chance to
achieve results that were commensurate with the risk. Tovey’s decision was that
unless Bismarck’s speed was reduced, King George V would leave the pursuit at
2400 on May 26 and proceed to refuel.307
At 1115, Bismarck reported its position some six hundred nautical miles west
of Brest. In the afternoon Lütjens was directed that if the bad weather in the Bay
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of Biscay prevented him from proceeding to Saint-Nazaire he should steer toward
Brest. Reichsmarschal Göring directed the Luftwaffe to make all efforts with the
aircraft available to support Bismarck’s return.308
At 1315, Somerville detached the cruiser Sheffield.309 The Admiralty also
directed Somerville not to engage Bismarck until other battleships arrived in
the vicinity; Force H’s Renown was no match for Bismarck.310 In the afternoon,
Sheffield obtained contact with Bismarck. The first aerial striking force from Ark
Royal flew at about 1450.311 Sheffield vectored the attack in.312 The aircraft reached
Bismarck at about 1550 and carried out their torpedo attack.313 However, all the
torpedoes missed their target.314
At 1630, an aircraft from Ark Royal reported Bismarck’s position at latitude
47° 40ʹ N, longitude 18° 15ʹ W. Bismarck was steering a southeasterly course
(120) at twenty-two knots. Somerville directed Sheffield to maintain contact with
Bismarck, while he kept Ark Royal and Renown outside the effective range of
Bismarck’s heavy guns.315
In one message from Lütjens, the SKL learned that Bismarck’s loss of fuel from
its ongoing leak was more serious than hitherto believed. Naval Group Command West considered sending one supply ship (Ermland) during the night of
May 26/27 to refuel Bismarck.316 By the evening the situation was considered very
serious, but the SKL expected that Bismarck would be able to defend itself against
torpedo attacks and in the early morning would be within the effective range of
Luftwaffe aircraft.317
Six U-boats were concentrated not far away from Bismarck; four had torpedoes, while two were without. At 1900, one U-boat (U-48) was directed to sail at
highest speed toward Sheffield, yet it never established contact.318 At 2000, one
U-boat (U-556) obtained contact with a battleship of the King George class, and
the carrier Ark Royal passed within effective range, but the U-boat had no torpedoes, and it lost contact.319
At 1910, fifteen Swordfish aircraft flew off from Ark Royal.320 Sheffield directed
them to Bismarck.321 Weather conditions were bad: skies 7/10 covered by low
rain clouds; winds force 6; seas rolling, with a northwesterly swell; and daylight
fading.322 The first wave of aircraft attacked at 2053.323 The British attack was
not synchronized, spreading over thirty-eight minutes, and only two of thirteen
torpedoes fired scored a hit. One torpedo hit the armor belt and had little effect.
But the second torpedo sealed Bismarck’s fate: it damaged the ship’s propellers,
wrecked its steering gear, and jammed its rudders.324 This severely affected Bismarck’s ability to maneuver, and therefore to continue sailing toward a French
port.325 The German AA fire was intense and accurate; Bismarck’s AA guns shot
down seven British aircraft.326
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The Germans intercepted many of the British radio messages to the destroyers and Force H.327 Observation and radio intercepts indicated that Bismarck was
surrounded by at least three, possibly four, battleships; the carrier Ark Royal; two
heavy cruisers; one light cruiser, and possibly a second; and the 4th Destroyer
Flotilla, with many modern destroyers.328 This spelled a situation that was hopeless for Bismarck. It was also tragic, because, except for being unable to maneuver,
the ship retained its full striking power.329 At that time, Bismarck was only four
hundred nautical miles from Brest, but enemy forces in the vicinity made it impossible to bring tankers to refuel.330 Very bad weather prevented the Germans
from using their destroyers or bringing out tugs to take Bismarck in tow. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were undergoing repairs. Bismarck’s only support would
come from the Luftwaffe and the U-boats operating in the Bay of Biscay.331
Admiral Tovey decided to detach from the Battle Force all five destroyers of
the 4th Destroyer Flotilla. They were directed to shadow and attack Bismarck.
Their reports to Tovey throughout the night were invaluable. Tovey requested
that Force H, with Ark Royal and Renown, withdraw southward to clear the way
for his battleships to close with Bismarck in the morning. The heavy cruiser Norfolk also arrived in the area.332
At about midnight, Lütjens sent a message to Naval Group Command West:
“Ship is able to defend itself and propulsion plant intact. Does not respond to
steering with engines, however.”333 The weather conditions were unfavorable. The
horizon was clear from northwest to northeast, but other sectors experienced
rainstorms and poor visibility. Bismarck made frequent changes of course between southwest and northeast. Its speed was only ten to twelve knots.334 Between
0122 and 0146 on May 27, three British destroyers (Cossack, Zulu, and Maori)
carried out torpedo attacks on Bismarck. Each destroyer achieved one hit.335 Bismarck’s speed was reduced to only eight knots and its movements became even
more erratic. Yet Bismarck still was able to deliver heavy and accurate fire.336
At 2400, Lütjens sent a message to Hitler: “We fight to the last in our belief
in you, my Führer, and in unshakable confidence in Germany’s victory.” At the
same time he also sent a message to Naval High Command and Naval Group
Command West: “Unable to maneuver. We fight until the last grenade. Long live
the Führer.” At 0153, Hitler sent a message to Lütjens: “Thank you in the name of
the entire German people.” He also addressed Bismarck’s crew: “All of Germany
is with you. What can still be done will be done.”337
At 0542, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that two FW-200s
had taken off at 0330 to conduct reconnaissance from 0445 to 0515, with another three bomber groups taking off at 0530.338 This was despite the fact that
the weather was highly unfavorable for air operations.339 Some German aircraft
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established contact with enemy cruisers and destroyers, but their effect on the
Bismarck situation was negligible.340
At 0835, Naval Group Command West informed Lütjens that at about 1100 on
May 27, the Spanish cruiser Canarias and two destroyers would leave El Ferrol
en route to Bismarck’s position, to be available to render assistance. They would
proceed at twenty to twenty-two knots.341
The End
In the morning on May 27, weather conditions were winds northwesterly at force
8, skies overcast, rainsqualls, and visibility of thirteen miles or so. Sunrise was at
0702.342 Bismarck sailed on course 330 at ten knots (see map 2). At 0755, Tovey’s
force had the enemy on bearing 120 at twenty-one miles. Tovey directed a course
change to the east (080) to close with Bismarck.343 At 0900, King George V and
Rodney turned to a southerly course (170) and opened fire with their main guns.
By 0930, Bismarck was on fire and virtually out of control; however, its speed was
not reduced, and its main guns still were firing. It also used its secondary armament.344 At 0954, Norfolk joined the action. All three ships fired independently at
ranges as short as 3,300 yards. By 1000, Bismarck’s main guns were out of action,
and ten minutes later the secondary guns stopped firing. Bismarck was now a
wreck, on fire fore and aft and wallowing heavily.345 Tovey ordered a stop to the
action, and all firing ceased at 1022. The cruiser Dorsetshire (which had left Convoy SL74) had just arrived at the scene of the action.346 Tovey ordered Dorsetshire
to close in to finish off Bismarck by torpedoing. So perhaps it was Dorsetshire’s
torpedoes that sank Bismarck, although German sources maintain that the ship
was sunk by activating scuttling charges.347 Bismarck sank at 1037, at latitude 48°
10ʹ N, longitude 16° 12ʹ W. Its colors still flew.348
Out of 2,200 men aboard the ship, only 115 were saved.349 The cruiser Dorsetshire took aboard eighty-five survivors and the destroyer Maori twenty-five. Then
the British ships stopped their efforts because of their concern that U-boats were
in the vicinity. U-74 saved three men and one weather steamer (Sachsenwald)
picked up two men on May 28.350
Bismarck showed a remarkable resilience. Out of seventy-one torpedoes fired,
at least eight, if not twelve, hit the ship.351 The number of hits by 16-inch shells
is unknown, but must have been very large. World War I had demonstrated the
Germans’ ability to build tremendously stout ships, and apparently they had not
lost it during the interwar years.352
Withdrawal of the Home Fleet
The ships of the Home Fleet returned to their bases in northern Scotland. King
George V and Rodney, with three destroyers (Cossack, Sikh, and Zulu), proceeded
northward. Dorsetshire and Maori rejoined them at 1230 on May 27, and nine
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other destroyers rejoined at 1600 on May 28. They received several signals warning of heavy enemy attacks on that day, but only four enemy aircraft appeared.
However, at 1200 on the 28th, one hundred miles to the south, destroyers Mishona and Tartar suffered heavy attacks, and Mishona was sunk. Rodney, screened by
Maori, and Columbia were detached to the Clyde at 1700 on May 28. Dorsetshire
was detached to the Tyne at 2316. Fog delayed the battleships, but they entered
Loch Ewe eventually, at 1230 on May 29.353
In his after-action report, Tovey wrote: “She [Bismarck] had put up a most
gallant fight against impossible odds, worthy of the old days of the Imperial
German Navy.” He opined that it was unfortunate that “for political reasons”
this fact could not be made public.354 Tovey praised the cooperation, skill, and
understanding that all forces had displayed during the prolonged chase of Bismarck; flag officers and commanding officers invariably acted as “I would have
wished before and without receiving instructions from me.”355 The Admiralty
exercised excellent strategic control. The coordination of the movements and
actions of the many disparate forces across a large part of the northern Atlantic
was superb. Admiral Tovey wrote that “the accuracy of information supplied by
the Admiralty and the speed with which it was passed were remarkable, and the
balance struck between information and instructions passed to the forces out of
visual touch with me was ideal.”356
The failure of RHEINÜBUNG and the sinking of Bismarck had a major effect
on the future employment of German heavy surface combatants against British
and Allied shipping in the North Atlantic. Admiral Raeder wrote later that prior
to May 27, 1941, he had considerable freedom of action in determining the employment of heavy surface ships, as long as there were no negative effects on the
actions of other services of the Wehrmacht. But because of the loss of Bismarck,
Hitler in his subsequent instructions greatly limited that freedom. Among other
things, he prohibited the sending of heavy ships to conduct commerce warfare
in the Atlantic, and the Kriegsmarine attempted no such operations for the remainder of the war.357
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS LEARNED
The main reasons for the failure of RHEINÜBUNG were as follows: the German
surface ships’ base of operations was extremely unfavorable in multiple ways; the
plan was overly reliant on the ships breaking out into the North Atlantic undetected; and—perhaps most important—air reconnaissance was inadequate, and
the ships were operating beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft.
The deployment and combat employment of the forces opposing R HEIN
ÜBUNG took place over the vast space of the North Atlantic. The harsh weather
conditions significantly affected the employment of surface ships and aircraft
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and the effectiveness of their weapons and sensors. Bad weather in the Denmark
Strait favored the Germans because it greatly enhanced the chances of an undetected breakout into the North Atlantic.
The German surface ships and aircraft operated from a very long and fragmented base of operations. Gaining access from the Arctic to the open waters
of the North Atlantic was extremely difficult. The British not only controlled
Iceland and all three passages to the Atlantic but also kept under surveillance the
southern part of the Arctic and southern Norway. Any German attempt to break
out to the North Atlantic was inherently a high-risk endeavor. Although the
Germans were well aware that British monitoring of the northern passages had
improved steadily over the course of 1941, they apparently were overconfident
in their ability to use bad weather to make an unobserved breakout through the
Denmark Strait.
Success in a war at sea is difficult and sometimes impossible to achieve without
favorable positions for basing one’s naval forces and aircraft. Disadvantages of
geography can be reduced but not eliminated by having highly capable ships and
aircraft. One of the key responsibilities of operational commanders and their staffs
is to evaluate realistically all aspects of the operating areas. In planning a major
naval/joint operation, it is critical to maximize the advantages and minimize the
disadvantages of one’s base of operations.
Both the Kriegsmarine and the Royal Navy were highly centralized organizations. Admiral Raeder was generally reluctant to allow full freedom of action
to subordinate operational commanders. The operational, and in many cases
the tactical, organization of the Kriegsmarine underwent frequent—and sometimes unnecessary—changes. The establishment of naval group commands did
not simplify but instead considerably complicated the C2 of German seagoing
forces. Naval group commands should not have been entrusted with operational
command of fleet forces. Raeder made an unsound organizational decision by
directing Lütjens, a four-star admiral, to command a single combat group at sea;
by doing so, Lütjens became subordinate in some matters to a junior admiral
(Saalwächter, the commander of Naval Group Command West). Perhaps such a
decision would have been appropriate if the entire operation had been carried out
using four battleships, as originally envisaged. The Kriegsmarine failed to move
the fleet headquarters ashore. If that had been done, the fleet commander would
have been a supported commander, while the naval groups’ commanders would
have been supporting commanders.
In the Royal Navy, the Admiralty exercised strategic, and in some cases operational, control over all seagoing forces and shore commands. It also often usurped
the responsibilities of subordinate commanders by making purely tactical decisions. The Home Fleet was the largest and most important seagoing force in
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home waters. Like the Kriegsmarine’s Fleet Command, the Home Fleet consisted
of several type commands. Each of these was responsible for both administration and operations. In combat, it is far more flexible and effective to organize
diverse forces into task forces/groups subordinate directly to the respective fleet
commanders. Type commanders should be responsible solely for combat training
and administration.
A major factor in the successful outcome of a major naval/joint operation is
sound operational command organization. Optimally, unity of effort should be
based on unity of command. A single operational commander should have full authority over and responsibility for subordinate tactical forces. Such authority should
not be shared among two or more commanders. Prior to the planning process,
higher authority should designate a single supported commander. All other commanders should support the supported operational commander fully.
Both British and German operational and tactical intelligence relied primarily on information obtained via air reconnaissance. Especially useful was
photoreconnaissance. At this time the British ability to penetrate and read the
German Enigma messages was not as effective as it would be later in the war. In
contrast, the German B-Dienst seems to have been highly effective in decrypting
British radio messages. One of the German advantages was that B-Dienst teams
embarked in major surface combatants, and they usually were very quick in decrypting enemy messages. The major advantage the British enjoyed over the Germans was their establishment of a highly effective network of agents in Norway
and other Scandinavian countries; perhaps the most effective of these was the British naval attaché in Stockholm and his helpers within the Swedish secret service.
Operational intelligence is one of the key elements for preparing sound plans for
a major naval/joint operation. It combines strategic and tactical intelligence. Operational intelligence should be based on information collected from diverse sources.
Human intelligence is a critical and irreplaceable source for obtaining an accurate,
timely, and relevant operational picture of the situation.
German naval operational planning was methodical and thorough. Normally, plans for a major operation were based on a relatively large number of
staff studies and critical comments on these studies by the SKL and naval group
commanders. The SKL and naval group commanders usually would issue broad
instructions, while tactical commanders would draft operations orders for subordinate commanders. The SKL’s objective was to employ the Kriegsmarine’s
heavy surface forces and auxiliary cruisers to complement the U-boats in their
war on the British transatlantic convoys. Raeder’s intent was to weaken British
naval strength in either home waters or the Mediterranean, and either to increase
convoy defenses or to reduce the number of convoys.
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For the Germans, an almost insurmountable problem was their numerical inferiority in surface forces and a lack of adequate and reliable air support. Hence,
the loss of any major surface combatant such as a battleship would have a much
greater negative effect than such a loss would have on the Royal Navy. For all the
high quality of its staff studies and the solid planning it conducted, the SKL made
some very unrealistic assumptions about the effect that employment of battleships would have on the naval situation in the North Atlantic. Perhaps the single
most important reason they were unrealistic was geography. Even if the Germans
incrementally had achieved sea control in the North Atlantic, they were not in a
position to maintain that control for any length of time; both the Kriegsmarine
and the Luftwaffe lacked sufficient strength and favorable bases of operations to
control such a vast area of ocean.
Sea control cannot be achieved by focusing on destroying the enemy forces defending convoys. Doing so invariably will result in a protracted war of attrition. Sea
control is accomplished primarily by destroying a major part of the enemy forces in
a major naval/joint operation in the initial phase of the war at sea. The obtaining
of sea control aims at accomplishing an operational or strategic objective; however,
consolidating one’s operational/strategic success by maintaining sea control also is
critical—otherwise the fruits of victory will be lost.
There is no doubt that the decision Raeder faced—whether to employ the
Bismarck combat group by itself in a new major operation against enemy convoys in the Atlantic—was a difficult one. The original intent—employing four
battleships—probably had a much greater chance of success. Another good
option would have been to delay the operation until Tirpitz, at least, was fully
operational. The employment of both Bismarck and Tirpitz jointly would have
compounded greatly the British problem in terms of preventing their breakouts
and their subsequent attacks on the transatlantic convoys. In using the Bismarck
group alone, Raeder took a high—and imprudent—risk. Everything depended
on the Bismarck group breaking out undetected; otherwise, it was reasonable to
expect (and not just in retrospect) that the British would make an all-out effort
to destroy the Bismarck group. Even if Bismarck successfully avoided detection
and subsequently attacked the convoys, it was almost certain the British would
do everything possible to prevent its return either through the Denmark Strait
or into a French port in the Bay of Biscay. Raeder’s concept of employing heavy
cruisers and auxiliary cruisers to attack enemy ocean shipping was essentially
sound; however, battleships—especially those of the Bismarck class—were another matter. The risk involved in employing such major surface combatants
beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe aircraft was simply too great, and hence
unacceptable. The Germans were well aware of the air threat to their surface
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ships, yet apparently their faith in their ability to break them out into the North
Atlantic undetected was too strong.
The operational deployment of the Bismarck group from Gotenhafen to Korsfjord, Bergen, proceeded uneventfully. But after the Admiralty and Home Fleet
received information from the naval attaché in Stockholm about the passage of
the Bismarck group through the Great Belt, they acted quickly. The cruise patrol
in the Denmark Strait was strengthened. A part of the Home Fleet then in Scapa
Flow was put into a state of increased combat readiness. Air reconnaissance of
the Norwegian ports and Arctic waters was intensified. Admiral Tovey properly
evaluated the situation and made sound decisions for the subsequent disposition
of his forces. Prior to the encounter in the Denmark Strait, Tovey’s dispositions
of the Battle Force and cruiser patrols covered all three northern passages, while
keeping his Battle Force centrally positioned and able to intervene in a timely
fashion toward the west or east.
The Germans suspected that British agents had sighted the movement of the
Bismarck group, but Admiral Lütjens made no major changes to his plans despite
his suspicions. Perhaps the chances of a successful breakout into the North Atlantic would have been greater if the Bismarck group had sailed to Trondheim
instead of Korsfjord, and had remained there for several weeks. This would have
kept the British in suspense about the direction and timing of the group’s next
movement.
Tactically, Lütjens handled the Bismarck group much better than his counterpart, Admiral Holland, handled his forces. The gunnery of both Bismarck and
Prinz Eugen was superior to that of the British ships. Holland made a mistake in
detaching his destroyers prior to the encounter, thereby missing the opportunity
to use them for a torpedo attack on the Bismarck group. Lütjens made a sound
tactical decision in not pursuing the damaged Prince of Wales; his main mission
was to attack enemy convoys, not to engage enemy heavy surface ships. Bismarck
had suffered damages in the encounter with Prince of Wales and their extent was
not precisely known at the time he had to make his decision. Reengaging Prince
of Wales might well have resulted in additional damage to Bismarck.
Why Admiral Lütjens decided on the morning of May 24 to steer for SaintNazaire instead of turning north and heading for Trondheim or Bergen is not
known. He probably had good reason to believe that it would be possible to break
away from his pursuers and make a westward swing into the open spaces of the
North Atlantic. Yet he was well aware that once his group was discovered the
British would make an all-out effort to destroy it. He also was much concerned
with the threat that enemy carrier-borne torpedo planes posed. At the same time,
the Bismarck group would operate well beyond the effective range of Luftwaffe
bombers. In retrospect, it seems that after the encounter with BCS 1 the sound
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decision would have been to withdraw back through the Denmark Strait. If
Lütjens had made the decision to do so quickly, he would have had a very good
chance of not encountering enemy heavy forces on his way to Trondheim or Bergen. In addition, the Bismarck group would have reached the protective cover of
Luftwaffe aircraft much sooner than on the route to Saint-Nazaire.
The British cruisers’ masterful use of their search radars made it impossible for
the Germans to shake off their pursuers. This was a major reason the Admiralty
and Admiral Tovey eventually were able to concentrate an overwhelming force
against Bismarck. The Admiralty took a high but prudent risk in detaching so
many ships from convoy duty to take part in the pursuit. In the final phase of the
operation, Bismarck’s chances diminished steadily. Perhaps if Bismarck had not
unluckily received the torpedo hit that disabled its rudder there would have been
some chance for the ship to reach the safety of a French port. Whether that would
have allowed Bismarck to survive is a question no one can answer for certain.
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